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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I critically review the major theories of modem mass
surveillance for the purpose of contributing to the developing field of
critical surveillance studies. This has meant firstly, assessing the influential
liberal/privacy perspectives on surveillance and the theoretically adjacent
organisational control approach in order to show how they have shaped the
great majority of surveillance studies around perspectives which not only
fail, on their own terms, to adequately understand the purposes and effects
of contemporary surveillance practices but also effectively obscure how the
staging of surveillance is deeply implicated in the expansion of capitalist
accumulation and the related restructuring of social control.
Secondly, I review the radical perspectives on surveillance in order to
illustrate how emerging techniques of highly sophisticated
informationalised surveillance, operated by new combinations of corporate
actors, is allowing the re-ordering of patterns of social behaviour around
the evolving sectoral needs of late capitalism. In this, I pay particular
attention to the explosive, and highly revealing, area of consumer
surveillance.
Finally, I examine recent theories of the social disciplinary effects of
electronic panopticism which are derived from Foucault's important studies
of surveillance-based institutional discipline. Modern electronic
panopticism is being soundly theorised but as yet there have been no studies
which explore the concrete application of discipline in particular social and
technological contexts. Without attempting to remedy this here, I finish
with an attempt to show, through the example of electronic funds transfer,
how an increasingly global architecture of communication and information
is being utilised in order to produce precise disciplinary effects. In this
case, for the inciting, directing, sorting, and correct performing of
consumption in Une with the changing needs of accumulation. An example
which may provide insight into wider developments of surveillance under
late capitalism.

Introduction
It has become a truism to maintain that the primary danger of
computerised surveillance is its threat to individual privacy. After all
such an assertion hardly comes as a surprise, for few citizens are free
from the growing web of information gathering which punctuates
nearly every aspect of their daily lives. Furthermore, few citizens are
aware of the existence or content of the hidden reservoirs of personal
information held by state and private organisations with which they
must routinely deal. Nor are they conscious of the complex circuits of
information exchange going on around them. However, throughout the
last twenty five years a growing volume of studies, beginning with
Westin's influential Privacy and Freedom, have sought to spell out and
warn of the deleterious effects surveillance is having on the conduct of
personal life. It is said that computerised surveillance threatens to
penetrate and disclose aspects of private existence in a manner which
undermines control over the information an individual wishes to
communicate about himself to others. This, in turn, leads to all manner
of distortions to the crucial aspects of human liberty which require
protected zones of privacy for their maintenance and sustenance.
Yet the pre-occupation with privacy conceals more than it reveals about
the role of surveillance in modem societies. Even within the terms of
the liberal discourse it is not clear just how surveillance invades
privacy, or how it distorts individual freedom. More importantly, this
discourse obscures the way in which the practices of surveillance are
implicated in the subtle disciplining of individuals around pattems of
behaviour which reinforce capitalist social power. This alternative
interpretation means disentangling the concept of surveillance from the
closely inter-related discourses of privacy and liberal social and political
theory. Firstly, part one will examine how the construction of privacy
as a series of spaces, each with a set of dependent functions central to
individual freedom and autonomy, lends itself naturally to an assessment
of surveillance based on the notions of intrusion and invasion. This
construction serves to obscure altemative interpretations of surveillance
as a mechanism of broad social control and precise individual discipline.
This obscuring of surveillance is further enforced through the
application of a larger liberal socio-political framework which

disaggregates social structure into series of formalised relationships
between private individuals, constituted as abstract entities replete with
sets of universal rights and obligations, and a public realm which both
limits and protects the individual in its provision of the social good.
Part two reviews three groups of studies which have moved beyond the
privacy thesis and assess surveillance as an integral element in the
concrete application of social power. Rule and his colleagues have
provided a comprehensive analysis of surveillance as a necessary
element in the maintenance and extension of organisational power in
social conditions dictated by a growing separation between the
individual and the organisation. Organisational surveillance operates to
identify and locate the anonymous mass of clients with which it deals in
order to efficiently regulate client behaviour around the organisations
rules. Despite important advances over the privacy theorists Rule's
work is organised within a framework of organisational pluralism
which repeats some of the limitations of the privacy thesis.
Organisations are abstracted from any determinate socio-economic
structure and surveillance practices are shaped by the overriding need
of individual organisations to maximise control over their client
environment. As a result, surveillance, as a method of social control, is
rather oddly divorced from capitalism and no distinction is made
between conmiercial and state organisations.
In contrast, the recent studies of Oscar Gandy, Kevin Wilson, Webster
and Robins, and Mark Poster specifically evaluate the role of
surveillance in the accumulation strategies of corporate capitalism and
are part of a growing number of radical studies, concentrating on the
expanding practices of commercial surveillance in order to understand
the vast system of social control developing in late capitalist societies.
For Gandy new surveillance techniques embedded in the modem
telecommunications infrastructure, such as consumer profiling and
targeting, interactive videotex, and electronic funds transfer (EFTS),
are part of a massive generation of information which functions as an
important lubricant' for capital, helping to smooth the circulation of
goods and services through production and consumption. A process,
however, which further disempowers already marginalised social
groups who lack access into the telecommunications infrastructure.

Wilson, concentrating on the videotex phenomenon, explores how new
cross-sector, corporate combinations of broadcasters, retailers, bankers,
financiers, and telecommunications carriers are shaping the delivery of
interactive information and entertainment services into the domestic
home, a strategy which also provides instantaneous shopping facilities
for viewers. The result is a real-time, on-line surveillance network
which manipulates a vast amount of data on individual consumers in
order to draw them into prescribed consumption patterns.
Part two concludes with an assessment of recent attempts to incorporate
Foucault's theory of disciplinary surveillance into critical analyses of
contemporary capitalist electronic panoptical discipline. The work of
Webster and Robins, and to a lesser extent that of Mark Poster, shows
how powerful corporate combinations are mobilising a network of
information technologies for the increasingly centralised discipline of
individual movement around the changing needs of transnational capital.
Finally, part three is an attempt to draw together the strands of
disciplinary panoptical surveillance, through the particular example of
EFTS, in order to show in some detail just how late capitalist discipline
is beginning to operate. EFTS depends on an elaborate system of
electronic surveillance, extending corporate control of the important
material process of consumption in ways which simultaneously
maximise consumer activity and direct it into increasingly purified sites
of corporate-dominated shopping, while carefully disciplining the
individual through the application of a battery of automated micropenalties for those who flout corporate rules. The complex patterning of
behaviour administered through EFT may be the beginning of a larger
disciplinary network, the understanding of which requires a definite
break with the analytical constraints of both the privacy interpretation
and that of pluralist organisational control.

PART ONE: THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE - COMPUTERS,
SURVEILLANCE AND PRIVACY
(i) Westin on privacy: setting the parameters for surveillance
studies
Westin's Privacy and Freedom has become the benchmark of
surveillance studies in the last two decades. Westin has not only
influenced the content of mass surveillance studies since but also its
explanatory framework, to the extent that there are very few studies
that do not take up the aspect of individual privacy as the primary
analytical focus. How then does Westin define privacy ?
privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when and how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others. Viewed in
terms of the relation of the individual to social participation,
privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a
person from the general society through physical or
psychological means, either in a state of solitude or small
group intimacy or, when among larger groups, in a condition
of anonymity or reserve. The individual's desire for privacy
is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged
in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the
desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and
communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society
in which he lives. The individual does so in the face of
pressures from the curiosity of others and from the processes
of surveillance that every society sets in order to enforce its
social norms 1
There are two features of this definition which have resonated through
surveillance studies ever since. Firstly, the structure of privacy is
assessed through the metaphor of enclosed space whether it be physical
or psychological. A metaphor which has a long heritage and is closely
related to legal doctrines of individual sovereignty which constructs the
self in the form of property and assigns definite rights of ownership and
1 A.F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York, 1967), p.7

control. Secondly, there is the notion of balance. The individual is
suspended between the contradictory impulses of withdrawal and
sociality. Westin maintains that the permanent 'struggle to achieve a
balance between privacy and participation' operates across all cultures
and all times, it is one of the 'core aspects of all social life'.^
Participation is assessed as dis-closure, a venturing out beyond the
boundaries of privacy. It can be self actuated, in the voluntary exposure
of the private self, or enforced through the curiosity of others and
through the surveillance practices of the society's social and political
authorities. Surveillance then is intrusion whether it be consented to by
the individual, hidden from him, or imposed upon him.3 Much of what
is termed here as the liberal perspective of surveillance is concerned
with the dangers of upsetting this balance between the twin necessities of
personal enclosure and and its enforced disclosure.
Westin maintains that privacy is a cultural universal, evident to some
extent in all cultures even though the level of tolerance for privacy in
individual cultures differs markedly. Nevertheless, he sites four aspects
of privacy particular to all cultures modem, primitive [sic] and even the
animal kingdom. All cultures employ sets of 'distance-setting'
procedures,^ 'rules of avoidance' to restrict the flow of information
about themselves to others', necessary for 'protecting the individual in
the stresses and strains of social interaction'.^ The means of distance
setting vary and range from forms of physical covering - veils, and
masks - to specially demarcated spaces with explicit rules of access, such
as the various rooms of domestic dwellings. Most cultures, but not all,
conceal genitalia, evacuation, sexual intercourse and often, moments of
death and illness. Individual withdrawal into seclusion and isolation is
also seen as a transcultural attribute of privacy. The need for
contemplation, self-evaluation, spiritual communion and regeneration.
Finally, small group privacy, essential for the creation of intimacy, is
another virtually universal feature of human culture.^

p. 11
'^ibid., pp. 19-20
^ibid., p.9
^ibid., p.l3
^ibid., pp.10-18

However, Westin's primary focus is on the important function privacy
performs for both the stability and dynamism of modem western
democracies. He approaches this by integrating the core features of
privacy - distance, seclusion, isolation, small group intimacy - into the
functional requirements of democratic political systems. In modem
societies it is the nature of the political system itself which is the
'fundamental force shaping the balance of privacy, since certain patterns
of privacy, disclosure and surveillance, are functional necessities for
particular kinds of regime'.^ He maintains that one of the reasons why
modem totalitarian regimes (fascism and conmiunism) ridicule privacy
as 'immoral', 'antisocial', and part of the 'cult of individuality' is
because the nurturing of independence, criticism and democratic
participation is dependent on the depoliticised physical, psychological
and group spaces which constitute individual privacy. Totalitarian
systems maintain an extreme privacy imbalance through intensified
surveillance in order to render transparent the hfe of the individual for
the purposes of extinguishing the challenge privacy presents to the
requirements of loyalty, obedience and uncritical acceptance of the
regime. A life without privacy becomes one of fear, distmst, loneliness
and isolation.8
In contrast, modem democratic systems generally preserve large areas
of social life, such as sport, art and literature, free from political
participation, whether enforced or voluntary. The small group privacy
of the family is important for the development of education, religion,
and moral commitments. Clubs, societies, and pohtical parties provide
important enclosures for independent discussion, criticism and
resolution of community issues. The privacy of institutions such as the
press, interest groups, and independent agencies are deemed essential
for the enforcement of government responsibility.9
While, for Westin, privacy is essential to the systemic requirements of
modem democracy, too much privacy, insufficient disclosure, also
presents dangers of its own. The provision of 'social good' - welfare
services and law and order - depends on some level of personal
disclosure for effective govemment planning, social research and law
^ibid., p.23
^ibid., pp.24-26

enforcement. Excessive individual seclusion and isolation becomes
socially dysfunctional, breeding apathy and indifference.lo
Westin also claims that the privacy balance differs amongst democratic
societies themselves. He contrasts the cultural conditions for the
expression of privacy in US, Germany and Britain. Germany manifests
an 'authoritarian democratic balance', a result of patterns ingrained in
traditional family structure, conditions of secrecy in government, and
high levels of respect for public authorities, all of which override the
rights of criticism and non-conformity. The overall effect is a lower
regard for individual privacy. In Britain a 'deferential democratic
balance' operates which preserves a high level of individual privacy in
both state administration and the realm of the individual. A 'tradition of
tolerating non-conformism which treats much deviant political and
social conduct as permissible private action' but also frees government
and state authorities from rigourous public scrutiny. Not surprisingly,
for Westin, the United States provides the most favourable balance. An
'egalitarian democratic balance' prevails, upholding a creative tension
between the nourishment of individuality and the lures and demands of
participation:
in which the privacy-supporting values of
individualism,associational life, and civil liberty are imder
constant pressure from privacy-denying tendencies toward
social egalitarianism, personal activism, and political
fundamentalismi^
In US history there has been a permanent dialectic between the credo of
individual and associational privacy - essential for civil liberty, free
expression and movement, dissent, pursuit of wealth, and high
sociability through group interaction - and the 'privacy-denying
tendencies' of equality, material progress, commitment to a
psychologically open, materialist lifestyle which incorporates 'distrust
and suspicion' of 'solitariness', 'unsociable types', and those dismissive
of private gain. Conditions in which 'political fundamentalism' has
^^ibid., p.25
H i m , p.27
p.26
p.27

thrived - xenophobia, isolationism, religious and racial prejudice, and a
moral absolutism dependent on a 'censorial watching over the private
lives of community members'. A balance which, in the post war era,
has swung from the privacy-invasive, McCarthyite cold war suppression
of internal criticism to the emergence of the civil rights movement in
the 1960's.i4
After examining the manner in which privacy is bound up with the
functioning of western democracy, Westin retums to explore, in more
detail, the mix of states and functions which constitute the core of
individual privacy. He begins with the universal states of solitude,
intimacy, anonymity and reserve. Solitude is the right of separation
from others and from exterior observation. As we have seen, this 'most
complete form of privacy' carries with it dangers for democratic
systems. Intimacy is the selective 'seclusion' of small groups from
outside prying and carries with it the intemal dissolution of the public
and private r e a l m s . A n o n y m i t y is the right to freedom from
'identification' in public space. The right to 'merge into the situational
landscape' in conditions of relaxation and freedom free from the
knowledge that systematic attention is being paid. Reserve is the
preservation of psychological 'interior' space,
These designated enclosures, classified along lines of interiority and
exteriority, demarcating the public and private realms of the individual
in society, provide the space for the set of intersecting functions of
privacy. Personal autonomy is the 'preserving [of] the uniqueness of the
individual by avoidance of being manipulated and dominated by
oihtTs'Emotional release is the maintenance of space and time free
from the exigencies of social norms, where societal expectations do not
intrude. It is also an unburdening of the disappointment, anger and
discontent generated through the necessities of public participation.18
Self-evaluation is required for 'self-organisation', the 're-integration' of
the myriad of public experience into pattems meaningful to individual
identity; a function also essential to creativity and the formulation of
^^ibid., pp.27-28
^^ibid., p.31
^^loc cit
l'7zm,pp.33-34
^^ibid., p.35

self-expression. Limited and protected communication is the right of
individual control over the disclosure of personal information, the
application of discretion over what information is released. As such it is
necessary for the building of trust and confidence.
Westin assigns these spatial and functional enclosures to a series of
concentric 'zones' in order to measure their specific weight in an
overall equation between privacy and disclosure. The 'outer zone' is
where the public and private dissolve in the unguarded disclosure of
expression 'open to all'. Interior to this is the 'zone of intimacy' where
selective disclosure is applied according to individual participation in
specific groups such as families and close personal relationships. He also
proposes a 'core self which is perfectly inviolate to intrusion - 'the
hopes, fears, prayers, beyond sharing'.^o
In conclusion, Westin, then, seeks to build the anthropological basis of
privacy into the functional necessities central to the reproduction of
democratic liberal culture, according to an individual and cultural
project replete with tensions and contradictions resulting from both the
protection of private space and and its partial dissolution. Individuals
are suspended in the psychological desire for, and the cultural
expectation of, participation, and equally strong desires for withdrawal.
Personal disclosure is both welcomed and enforced. Before examining
the social forces behind the intensification of enforced disclosure, i.e.
organised surveillance, in the early analyses of the surveillance
theorists, it is worth examining how Westin's concentration on privacy
set the agenda for proceeding analyses in the first wave of surveillance
studies.
(ii) Reinforcing the Privacy Interpretation
Wamer and Stone's 1970 study The Data Bank Society follows Westin
closely in linking surveillance to privacy, concentrating on the dilemma
of participation and withdrawal, enclosure and disclosure:

^^ibid., pp.36-38
'^^ibid., p.33

we are ambivalent beings possessing a gregarious instinct
matched by the desire to retreat from the world...we need
both to share and withhold...not only a desire but an absolute
need for a core of privacy into which no one else is admitted^i
However, whereas Westin sought to identify privacy in terms of
anthropological universals, Warner and Stone stress the particular
historical influences of western culture. While they traced the general
notion of individual privacy back to the Judeo-Christian ethic of the
'dignity of the person as a unique creation', they maintained that much
of what is accepted as the right to privacy today is a result of the vast
social and political upheavals of modernity. The process of
industrialisation and rapid urbanisation dissolved the extended
communal spaces constituting social life, producing the much more
sharply defined private domestic space of the single family unit. The
French revolution instituted the ideology of the rational individual with
specific constitutionally-protected rights and freedoms. It is the
coalescence of these diverse strands which give privacy its
contemporary force.22 Yet, like Westin, they accept that privacy is a
'fluctuating value' containing necessarily vague and unquantifiable
'intangibles' which make the gauging of the legitimate scope of intrusion
a difficult, but no less crucial, task.23
Martin and Norman, addressing the national data bank issue in the late
1960's, pose the dilemma between disclosure and privacy, restating
Westin's concerns over the delicate relationship which constitutes the
egalitarian democratic balance between private right and the provision
of public good:
the problem with 'privacy' is its conflict with other
social values, particularly competent government, a free
press, protection against crime, provision of services,
collection of taxes, and the development of community
living environments^^
21M Warner and M Stone, The Data Bank Society (Allen and Unwin, London, 1970), p. 124
cit
23 ibid., p. 126
Martin and AR Norman, The Computerised Society (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970),
p.320

Therefore the necessary invasion of privacy to secure these social
benefits must be based on the assurances of anonymity and
confidentiaUty guaranteed through individual consent.
In the Assault on Privacy, Miller assesses the early evidence on the ways
in which computers are challenging traditional modes of privacy
invasion. His definition of privacy, once again, follows Westin. He
points to the difficulty of classifying privacy, stressing its
'exasperatingly vague' and 'evanescent quality' enveloping a number of
basic rights and protections. He also recognises that the inability to pin
point precisely where privacy starts and ends, because of its dependence
on cultural context, must not obscure the fundamental right of
individuals to control the information flowing from their personal life.
Insufficient control leads to familiar privacy-denying problems such as
interference into the right of personal seclusion and solitude.^^
Mowshowitz also recognises that privacy, as a moral right and a
psychological requirement, is a socially contingent and fragile entity. He
traces its philosophical heritage back to the 'social contract' school of
eighteenth century liberalism in the work of Locke, Rousseau and Mill,
uncovering principles and arguments which surface throughout the
entire corpus of the privacy/surveillance debate. His study recalls the
primary division between 'civil society' and the 'state of nature' and the
creation of a social contract among men for the governance of society
according to the norms of human reason. This entailed a series of
commitments, obligations and renunciations on the behalf of the
individual to the state as the sovereign 'collective interest' of liberal
society. In retum, the state, guided by the deliberations of freely elected
representatives, provides the 'public good', centred on the rights of
liberty and property.26 This divide between the public sphere, defined
after Rousseau, as the 'totality of particular, private interests', and
individual right, is central to the liberal definition of privacy for it
places basic expectations and hmitations on both parties. The individual
as the site of liberty requires psychic and physical distance (privacy)
under the proviso that he must subsume some of this right for the state's
25 A.R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy (The New American Library Inc, New York, 1971), p. 188
26A. Mowshowitz, The Conquest of Will (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 1976), pp. 172-173

administration of public good, a process which entails some
surrendering of this distance.
In many ways Mowshowitz' definition of privacy, in terms of person,
property and information, represents the intersection of anthropological
and classical liberal narratives of privacy. Westin's states and functions
of privacy are supplemented by specific rights and protections accorded
by liberal theory in the balance between individual liberty and the
necessities of social enquiry.
(iii) Privacy and Surveillance: Establishing the Connection
From Westin onwards the vast majority of analyses of surveillance have
been considered from the aspect of individual privacy. We have already
seen that privacy has been constructed in terms of a spatialised
enclosure, and that it is constantly compromised by the individual
desire, and the social necessity of, disclosure. Westin defines
surveillance as enforced disclosure. In modem societies this is secured
in three ways - through observation, extraction, and by Ûit ^ ^
techniques of data surveillance. Each technique is staged for the
enforcement of rules and norms particular to the surveilling agent,
whether it be another individual, a state agency or commercial
organisation, and each intrudes into particular spaces and functions of
privacy. All three have spurned ever new privacy-depleting
technological innovations. Yet, when properly regulated, they can also
serve socially, and individually, positive ends.^'^
Surveillance through observation is an important method of securing
individual compliance to institutional norms and regulations. Westin
claims that the simple fact of awareness of being observed is a powerful
corrective to potential non-compliance. Although a careful balance
needs to be maintained between a level which reinforces behavioural
expectations and that which intrudes destructively into personal privacy
sapping individual loyalty and promoting hidden forms of deviant
behaviour. In fact, Westin states that the extreme of near 'total physical
surveillance' has traditionally been a defining feature of totalitarian
social systems as well as Utopian social experiments. Because the
27westin (1967) op cit, pp.57-58

extinguishing of all boundaries to privacy is aimed at 'perfecting'
behaviour by rendering it completely visible. Nevertheless, some level
of visibility can operate as a protector of privacy, by improving the
physical security of private individuals in public space or through the
monitoring of individual welfare.^»
The second technique of surveillance is extraction, defined by Westin as
'entry into a person's psychological privacy by requiring him to reveal
by speech or act those parts of his memory or personality that he
regards as private'.^^ Extraction is related to forms of psychological
testing which at the time was threatening to spread beyond traditional
users such as police and welfare agencies into the wider counselling
profession and beyond into the workplace for the testing of suitable
employees. Westin believed these methods of extraction to be damaging
to individual autonomy by enforcing a standardised and conformist
intemal life, compliant to elitist professional expectations. A diminution
of inner freedom and creativity in favour of a 'bland normality'.^^
Finally, Westin identified data surveillance as potentially the most
dangerous of privacy invading techniques, and one that he spent the rest
of his early writings analysing as developments in computerised recordkeeping and centralised data storage gathered momentum. Data
surveillance was interpreted as an adjunct to existing manual and
mechanical techniques of observation.^! The conflation of data and
physical observation has since become a standard procedure in
surveillance studies directing the analysis of surveillance along privacy
lines. In assessing the scope and potential for data surveillance, Westin
noted a number of social and technological trends and pointed to future
prospects, some of which have proved uncannily accurate. In short,
Westin's early analysis has continued to provide not only the
methodological framework for the analysis of data surveillance (the
invasion of privacy) but piá also the substantive content of future studies
as well as the permissible range of solutions to its perceived dangers.

^^ibid., p.59
29/m., p.60
^(^ibid., p.61
31zm,pp.l58-160

Technological trends
As Privacy and Freedom was written in the early days of the
transformation from manual to computerised record-keeping techniques
Westin's primary concerns were concemed with mounting fears of the,
as yet unknown, potential of computers. Rapid advances in computing
power and the advent of magnetic tape and disc storage techniques
promised a future of accelerating data collection and greatly enhanced
storage capacity. Fears were intensified as a result of proposals for
massive centralised data banks for the pooling of information from a
range of data gathering institutions. There was also some early evidence
of increased routine sharing of data among government organisations
and private sector institutions made easier by computerisation. In
addition, there were some early indications that credit card transactional
data was revealing details of individual movement, purchase patterns,
and up to date knowledge of personal financial circumstances.
Computerisation promised, and was already beginning to achieve, a
profound transformation of the nature of personal documentation. Data
was no longer restricted to the place of its generation and its shrinking
physical form was making it more mobile which meant that increasingly
mundane and routine details of personal life could be gathered, sorted,
and exchanged between organisations, preserving inaccuracies, errors
and all manner of information tom from the original context.32
Social trends
Westin identified two levels of social change behind the expansion of
computerised record-keeping. The first level concemed the growth and
extension of institutional power - the steady accumulation of
govemment regulatory functions, the increasing bureaucratisation of the
private sector, and the growing demand for aggregate data for the
purposes of social planning and bureaucratic provision. Massive
information gathering exercises such as census programmes, voter
registration, law enforcement, and social welfare and taxation
programmes were multiplying and extending in scope and were
interpreted by Westin as the beginning of a trend toward the

pp.163-168

institutional administration of social life.33 Moreover, a process which
was being mirrored by private sector initiatives in health insurance,
welfare programmes, and the expanding administration of credit. A
related fear was that so-called statistical information generated in these
programmes could be personally identified by tagging them with unique
identification numbers thereby further enhancing the accumulation of
personal data. The creation and centralisation of detailed personal files
amassed by increasingly hidden, impersonal contacts with dispersed
organisations, thereby documenting more and more aspects of private
existence, threatened a progressive dehumanisation and
depersonalisation of individual life, an undermining of personal
responsibility, an extinguishing of the sources of autonomy, and an
exposure of citizens to greater manipulation.^^
Westin held that this extension in institutionalised data gathering was
evidence of an adherence to a new information theory superseding an
older approach which addressed the individual as a unique entity and
based the collection of personal data on a restricted range of localised
face-to-face interactions. Whereas new patterns of data gathering
constructed individuals as physically absent, statistical identities and
subjected them to a battery of predictive uses. A 'behavioural-predictive
theory' 'which assumes the need for much more psychological and
organisational data in order to make the decisions of social science,
business and government. The more computers offer the opportunities
to simulate behaviour, forecast trends, predict outcomes, the more
pressure is generated for personal and organisational information to be
collected and processed'.^s A process leading to the establishment of
'mixed information' files containing selectively merged personal data
with broader social and psychological classifications. Amassed details of
personal life may be subsumed into psychological and sociological
narratives. The resulting dissolution of existing distinctions between
personal and statistical data carries with it dangerous privacy
implications. Regardless of the problems of error and inaccuracy of the
data contained within, these highly detailed 'record prisons' carry the
status of permanent documentary evidence of individual lives, one that
challenges looser and more hazy contents of memory and on-going self33/6/^., p. 161
34im,pp.298-310
35zm, p.322

estimation. The effect on privacy is a further loss of control over
knowledge generated from the life activities of the self, damaging the
privacy dependent functions of self-evaluation and the 'freedom to seek
self-realisation in an open environment'. ^^
For Westin, the trends toward expanded institutional power and
bureaucratised practices are symptomatic of larger transitions to a
highly complex mass society in which the emerging institutional
administration of social life is a product of incessant technological
innovation, an increasingly affluent and mobile citizenry, and a
transformation of social relations from face-to-face mediations between
private individual citizens and localised public authorities to a more
standardised data-based relationship between a depersonalised mass and
large, distant bureaucracies.37 While he claimed surveillance has always
been an important historical requirement for the protection of public
safety, the rights of citizens, and the enforcement of social norms, new
methods of surveillance were not merely the product of technological
advance but part of some seismic shifts in the structure of western
society which were disturbing the delicate balance between individual
privacy and the requirements of social administration.38
In studies since, most of the themes explored in Westin have reappeared as the nexus between surveillance and privacy has attained the
status of unchallenged dogma. And, importantly, the issue of privacy
has set the emotional tone of much of what was to follow. Ironically
though, Westin's empirical follow up to the more theoretical Privacy
and Freedom concluded with a measured denial of media hysteria about
the dangers of computerisation. Databanks in a Free Society, which was
commissioned by the National Academy of Sciences, contained
individual profiles of computerising organisations in the public,
commercial, and non-profit sectors and included a series of site visits to
organisations in relatively advanced stages of computerisation. Westin
and Baker found that computerised records had not increased in volume
and scope when compared with manual systems and that the collection
of 'sensitive' and 'subjective' personal data had not increased. In fact,
the so-caUed 'special purpose files' of non standardised information had
p.323
37/^,/^., p.158
p. 159

remained largely manual in form. There was also no evidence that
computerised systems were leading to increased data sharing among
organisations nor of the merging and matching of organisationally
discrete data. User access and client notification rights generally
followed those established under manual systems.39 However, these
conclusions have not gone unchallenged. Rule et al described Westin and
Baker's study as 'deeply optimistic' and based too strictly on a single
empirical method, that of employer response to survey q u e s t i o n s . ^ ^ One
might also add that the computer technology of the time had not yet
reached the 'take-off stage which would allow the real time networking
of data among organisations nor the incredibly diverse points of
automated data collection which were to follow. In addition storage
techniques were still at this point relatively cumbersome and tied data
down to the organisational location at which it was generated.
Dunn and Wessel examined the problem of demarcation between
personal and statistical data, a crucial issue in early 'data bank' debates.
Supporters of centralised statistical data banks defended invasion of
privacy accusations by arguing that statistical data for the purposes of
research only would be included. Thus the privacy theorists needed to
maintain a clear definition of each category and a meaningful distinction
between the two. Dunn's classification, however, was relatively vague.
Personal (or 'intelligence') data was defined as 'data about individuals as
individuals', a case of 'finding out' about the individual. Whereas
statistical data systems 'produce information that does not relate to the
individual' but identifies characteristics that relate to 'groups' or
'populations', generating 'aggregates', 'percentages' and 'describing
relationships'. Statistical databases result from the observation of the
'public face of the individual'.^! As we shall see (see p.34) neither
definition helped to clearly classify the difference between personal and
statistical data and where the boundary between them should lay. Yet in
most studies the term 'personal data' is freely used and, furthermore,
linked without examination to the reakn of privacy.

39a.F. Westin and M.A. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society (Quadrangle, New York, 1972), pp.245-
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Wessel claimed that a greater danger lay in the assumption that only
centralised personal data held privacy implications especially the
problem of inaccuracy and error. He believed so called 'data-in-gross'
had a number of effects which were not considered by the data bank
proponents. Echoing Westin, he worried over the 'stigmatising' and
'stereotyping' effect of statistical profiling in areas where it was
becoming widespread such as law enforcement and in the calculation of
insurance premiums. Data-in-gross was not protected by privacy torts
yet it diminished individual autonomy and integrity, generalising people
into social categories irrespective of individual circumstance.^^ In
contrast to Dunn, Wessel thought all data on individuals was coloured
by subjective interpretation and depended in what context and for what
purposes it was used. ^^
Warner and Stone and Mowshowitz continued and extended the social
complexity and individual mobility theme of Westin. Wamer and Stone
feared that the freedoms of the 'permissive society' - mobility, choice,
expression - was producing the contradictory phenomenon of tighter
bureaucratic control:
we are in a tight circle (which may well prove to be a spiral of
encroaching legislation breeding a lack of restraint which, in
turn, breeds demands for new legislation. The permissive
society is in many ways paradoxically becoming a more
restrictive society^
In the Conquest of Will, Mowshowitz argued that the expansion and
centralisation of record-keeping in modem western societies is the
result of a technocratic response to an industrial system which is
fracturing under the pressure of social disorganisation - increased social
mobility, specialisation of function in the work place, state
administration, corporate organisation, and increasing community
dependence on distant bureaucracies for the provision of individual
security and welfare.45 He is critical of a technocratic ideology which
defends the centralised administration of social and individual life as the
42wessel op cit, p.38
^'^ibid.. p.40
44wamer and Stone op cit, p. 141
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only solution to fissures developing in the 'rambling edifice of modem
s o c i e t y ' A c c o r d i n g to Mowshowitz, this is an ideology which not only
reinforces the interests of the technocratic elite but also incorporates
biologistic notions of species and eco-systemic complexity in order to
naturalise the processes of social change. The natural 'evolution' of
social complexity necessitates strengthened bureaucracies. An important
aspect of social complexity overlooked in this ideology of
administrators, planners and managers is that much of it is due to the
modem extension of individual social choice in the freedom of mobility
in occupation, residence, and lifestyle. And this is one of the main
reasons behind the enormous generation of personal data.^'^ However,
the resulting conflict between the administration of social needs and the
increasing mobility of citizens need not be solved by a deepening
concentration of power. For Mowshowitz, there are altematives to this
brand of social determinism such as a voluntary retreat back toward
smaller scale organisational structures and the re-establishment of
community responsibility and control. The only obstacle being the
'absence of a coherent system of values' capable of challenging the
technocratic dominance.
(iv) Liberal Surveillance Studies After the 'first wave':
Working With the 'invasion of privacy' Thesis.
Computers and Bureaucratic Surveillance
It is possible, accepting a certain overlap, to classify a second wave of
surveillance/privacy studies dating from the late 1970's through to the
early 1980's. Although these studies were still centred on the problem
of privacy, they are less concerned with the initial 'shock' of
computerisation and the potential effect on the fragile dialectic between
private rights and organisational intmsion. The work of Wicklein,
Bumham, and Campbell and Connor are, in Kling's terms, an 'expose'
of the developing sophistication of computerised surveillance and the
^^ibid., p.238
^^ibid.. p.246

patterns of bureaucratic manipulation of personal data.'^^ xhe emotional
tone is not one of future threat but actually existing dangers.
Wicklein, in Electronic Nightmare, identified two levels of technical
and bureaucratic convergence which were revolutionising the capacity
of modem surveillance. Firstly, he thought the changing technical
structure of surveillance was bringing together both the increased
capacity of centralised computer storage and a emerging network of
telecommunications links. The outcome is a deepening real-time
interactivity between individual and corporate (conmiercial and state)
c e n t r e . S e c o n d l y , this technical convergence was leading to the
possibility of a 'single authority winning control of the whole system
and its c o n t e n t s ' . I n his case study of the videotex phenomenon
Wicklein showed how large corporations such as AT&T and Time Inc.
were diversifying in order to control the delivery of information
content (news, radio and television, entertainment, advertising) through
the new fibre optic and satellite technologies as well as generating
important data on individual viewing patterns. Wicklein claimed that
corporate convergence threatened privacy in new and damaging ways.
Detailed personal dossiers generated by corporate 'services' will not
only be enhanced but rapid exchanges of electronic data between
government agencies, credit reference centres, employers, broadcasters,
and private investigators will further 'violate inner space', and reduce
the protected spaces necessary for intimacy and autonomy.52
Bumham, in The Rise of the Computer State, concentrates on the
emergence of large, centralised bureaucratic databanks in both the
private (AT&T, credit reference agencies) and the public sphere
(Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, the FBI's
National Crime Information Centre) and how personal information
drawn from supposedly innocent sources, such as data on credit card use
or personal phone logs can be used for directly political purposes such
as tracking the movement of suspects, clients, political enemies.53 Like,
49 R, Kling, The Struggles for Democracy in an Information Society', The Information Society,
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Wicklein, Bumham is also concerned by the ease in which organisations
like the FBI routinely cooperate with credit reporting organisations and
private telecommunications carriers in the creation of a national
network of surveillance. Bumham, like Westin, notes the danger of
mixed databases containing 'statistical' and 'personal' information, such
as the US Internal Revenue Service's 'Taxpayer Compliance
Measurement Program' which constructs a hierarchy of categories of
taxpayers based on the level of compliance with taxation rules. Specific
individuals who happen to fall into the lower statistical categories are
then subject to a more exhaustive audit than others.^"^
Campbell and Connor's On the Record, is a detailed study of the
development of massive state databanks in Britain and the complex
architecture of routine information exchange between them. The study
examined the inter-relations between such large data bases as the
National Health Service Central Register, the Police National Computer,
and the secret national security register known as the Joint Computer
Bureau operated by MI5. These personal information gathering systems,
by way of the national insurance numbering scheme, combine to
provide a comprehensive record of all British citizens. Campbell and
Connor generally proceed from a privacy perspective, stressing the
importance of protecting informational privacy especially in regard to
the creation of intelligence profiles on citizens by the police and social
welfare agencies which contain a wide variety of personal data over and
above that required for the administration of a particular government
service. Such data gathered and exchanged by over-lapping and
cooperating agencies is often riddled with inaccuracies, errors, outdated
details, and data derived out of context from other bureaucratic
sources.55
Surprisingly, these accounts of massive computerised surveillance are
anchored in a privacy analysis which reiterates common themes of
forced personal disclosure, the destruction of intimacy, the chilling of
individual right to free speech and expression, and the loss of control
over personal information.
pp.108-110.
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The Rise of Specialist Studies: Exploring the 'new surveillance'
A trend in surveillance studies in recent years has been the examination
of specific privacy effects in the wake of new innovations in
information and communications technology in a wide range of social
settings - the workplace, on the road, in the home, and the individual on
the move between transactional locations. These studies relate to the
changing technological structure of mass surveillance, characterised by
Marx as the 'new surveillance': the automated, and largely hidden,
tracking of individual movement, collapsing temporal and spatial
distance between the individual and the operators of s u r v e i l l a n c e . ^ ^
Recent studies have also considered the re-appearance, in new
technological guises, of older themes such as centralised storage of
personal data and government attempts to institute universal
identification schemes in order to better manage and manipulate such
data.
Marx's studies of new technology in the workplace show how invisible
and automated monitoring of worker attendance and performance is
restricting worker autonomy on the shopfloor and sapping the
confidence of labour in management. In addition, the very invisibihty of
electronic surveillance encourages a rigourous self-monitoring as the
worker actively participates in his own surveillance. Martin in his study
of the surveillance potential of automated vehicle identification and
route guidance systems which locate, track and guide private
automobiles in order to better manage growing traffic volumes
concludes that these systems are an example of bureaucratically inspired
technical fixes to deeper problems of societal over-reliance on the
private automobile.Moreover, they provide ample opportunity for
bureaucratic misuse in the unauthorised exchange of data on precise
patterns of individual movement to interested third parties such as the
police or state welfare agencies.^^
^^For a summary of the 'new surveillance' see G.T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988), pp. 217-224
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A range of studies have also appeared addressing the privacy effects of
new communications technologies. For example, the introduction of
automated dialling services and calling line identification systems have
been the subject of much telecommunications policy debate.59 Detractors
point to new opportunities of advertisers and marketers to undermine
the anonymity of individuals in their private home and how
programmed re-dialling removes personal control over in-coming calls.
It is already known that this unauthorised gathering of data is being used
for direct marketing purposes. It is also believed that people may
refrain from obtaining or providing sensitive information (eg. AIDS,
pregnancy advise, volunteering police information) if line identifiers
expose their identity
Several international studies of the three waves of electronic banking EFTS, EFTPOS and 'smart cards' - have pointed to numerous privacy
implications. Reports compiled by the Australian Science and
Technology Council (ASTEC)^! and the OECD^^ raise concems about
the documentation of previously anonymous cash transactions which
leave a trail of individually-identified client movement. EFTS data
provides real-time monitoring of individuals and can be exchanged to
third parties for the tracking of criminals, suspects, welfare cheats. The
reliance of EFTS on public telecommunications networks also makes it
susceptible to unauthorised access through wire-tapping. EFT data can
be channelled into the compilation of consumer records by financial
institutions who can adjudge credit worthiness on finely detailed data of
expenditure and borrowing pattems. Point-of-sale (POS) data can be
manipulated by retailers for the intrusive targeting of new products to
hitherto unidentified customers.63 Finally, the advent of so-called 'smart
cards' which are essentially portable personal financial databases.
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instantaneously updated at every transactional point, extend the scope
for the unauthorised dissemination of private data.64
The fear has also been revived regarding the centralisation of personal
information. Linowes wams of the dangers of the largely unseen data
gathering operations of the credit reporting industry which accumulates
and exchanges enormous amounts of data from public and private
sources in order to assess credit worthiness. He maintains that many of
the largest databases of personal information are linked to the
administration of personal finance. Such data impinges on privacy
because it is generally gathered and exchanged without consent, at least
a third of it is inaccurate, and a great deal of it is not essential to credit
assessment.65 Furthermore, Linowes claims that the growing cost of
credit assessment is leading to a change in the techniques of
adjudication. In a confirmation of Westin's much earlier concerns,
individually identified data is being replaced by clusters of statistical
indicators which may bear no resemblance to individual circumstance
but nevertheless decides admission to credit and determines personal
floor limits. Linowes, echoing Westin and Wessel, believes such a
practice 'diminishes individuality' because 'it is virtually impossible to
identify exact reasons for credit refusal...the credit granting decision is
totally dehumanised'.66

(v) Translating the Privacy Interpretation into Legal
Discourse: The Problem of Designating Data Ownership and
Control
As is to be expected, considering the close relationship traditionally
existing between classical liberal and bourgeois legal theory, solutions to
the problem of surveillance and privacy have been translated into data
protection laws incorporating universal sets of fair information
principles. The process of translation is centred on two aspects. Firstly,
the reification of data generated through the growing volume of
^ F o r an international review of smart card developments and privacy implications see, J.A. Reese,
'Smart Cards: Microchip Technology Revolutionises the Development of Bank Cards',
Telecommunication Journal, Vol. 59, No.3, 1992, p. 139.
65D.F. Linowes, Privacy in America (University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1989), pp.127-129.
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transactions between institutions and individuals is translated mio forms
of property. This includes all transactional traces whether they be paper
documentation or the electronic capture, and storage of, voice, data and
image. Secondly, this mass of property is assigned
ownership,
incorporating specific rights of control over owned data.
There have been many unresolved problems in the translation to legal
discourse, some of which are intensifying as result of rapid
technological change. Westin's study on constitutional protections
against surveillance found that technological developments in physical
surveillance could be effectively incorporated into existing concepts of
trespass, intrusion and the rights of private ownership of property.
However, he believed the development of systematic data surveillance to
be dangerously free from any constitutional or legal regulation. This
was because in a culture which promoted the free circulation of
information no binding procedures had been developed to protect its
'improper' collection, storage and transmission.^» Westin suggested
constitutional changes such as the addition of a 'right not to
communicate' clause in the first amendment and legal changes which
would identify the right to ownership and control over personal
information as a property right. He also argued for the adoption of
procedural and substantive due process, guaranteeing rights of
notification, access, examination and correction of data^^ and that
bureaucratic decision-making based on such data should not be
'arbitrary and capricious'.^o He proposed a set of administrative
procedures to be operative at the organisational level which would
properly regulate conditions of access and usage at the input, storage
and output stages of the informational cycle. Rights and limitations on
access could also be more carefully administered if they were based on
on a clear categorisation of the status of accumulated data. He nominated
three categories which closely approximated his 'zones of privacy':
matters of public record would attract no access restrictions or
limitations on usage; confidential information given in trust to certain
individuals or agencies and which is subject to restrictions on use
67A.F. Westin, 'Civil Liberties Issues in Public Databanks', in Westin (ed.), Information Technology
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beyond the organisation itself; and security information which is that
provided under the proviso of 'non-circulation' beyond the individual
and agency directly involved^!
Although some of Westin's proposals have been taken up in the
application of 'fair information' procedures, further problems have
arisen in the wake of innovations in information and communications
technology. For example, many traces of interaction, transaction, and
communication have become 'de-territorialised'^^ and can no longer be
fixed to a geographical point and thus escape previously simple
designations of ownership. This disintegration of clear patterns of
ownership presents a serious challenge to both privacy theorists and
policy makers who attempt to solve the problem of data surveillance
through property-based laws of ownership and control. Data considered
to be private but not under the control of the data subject (often because
it has been generated without her knowledge) has been subject to an
increasing variety of uses such as a host of 'secondary' uses by the data
gathering institution as well as its sale to 'third parties'.'73 These
problems have spumed some intemal criticism of the weaknesses of
privacy legislation.
In-house critics of the translation to legal discourse

According to Rule the problem of ownership and control, dealt with in
data protection legislation, has followed two paths. Firstly, there has
been the establishment of 'procedural measures', pieces of legislation
formulated in the wake of technological change which 'guide the flow of
data once it has been collected, and the setting down of ground rules for
what the parties to the data-keeping relationship may and may not do'.^^
These rules are generally based on the notion of fair information
principles - which provide procedures of client notification of the kinds
of data generated and the data source, which third parties have right of
access to this data, the setting of definite limits to the purposes for
which the data can be used and how long it can be held, and the right of
71westin (1971) op cit, p.308
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individual redress if data is inaccurate or misused.^^ In a recent study of
the politics of data protection planning and implementation Regan found
that the fate of fair information principles, whether they became
operative and enforced in law, depended on how influential major data
gathering bureaucracies were in protecting their domain of control
from external regulators. In Regan's view much of the privacy and data
protection legislation has become purely symbolic, pious legalisms
offering no real control of bureaucratic practice.^é Laudon has pointed
to an on-going tension in the US between the bureaucratic
implementation of fair information principles and governmental
pressures to reduce budget deficits (eg. the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984) through large scale information sharing across state bureaucratic
boundaries. According to Laudon this is undermining the struggles of
privacy advocates throughout the 1970's against the establishment of a
national data centre. The demands of fiscal accountabihty in the 1980's
has been the impetus behind the creation of 'de facto national data
centres' which link personal file data from a range of participating
government departments (Medicare, Intemal Revenue, Social Security)
and, increasingly, private employers. This has resulted in the
construction of an informal national information system, representing a
definite 'retreat from privacy' in the 1980's.'77
Rule believes that these procedural measures need to be bolstered by
'substantive rules', clearly defining 'what forms of information can or
cannot be collected in the first place, or what kinds of information do or
do not have the right to exist'.'^^He sees the application of more
rigourous substantive rules as the most effective method of combating
the problems of ownership and control, especially in the control of the
broader proliferation of information more generally. One strategy
advocated by Rule is the creation of 'artificial barriers to such
infringements in the form of policy measures to restrict or reshape
information flow'. An example of this would be a clear and
unambiguous commitment to the 'presumption of confidentiality'
operating as a blanket acceptance 'that data provided for one purpose
^^ibid., pp.14-16
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will indeed be only used for that purpose and others compatible with it'.
According to Rule this would help to restrict the increasingly routine
re-use of information by the same data gathering organisation in other
contexts of interest and its circulation beyond the organisation itself.^^
Although no advice is offered on how this may be implemented and
enforced beyond the commonly accepted need for an independent
privacy regulator
However, for the critics of existing privacy legislation the estabUshment
of legally enforced client control over the use and distribution of data
must be supplemented by a binding commitment to a basic core of
individual privacy, the identification and placement of a boundary
inviolate to all kinds of intrusive surveillance that rapid technological
change presents. Marx proposes a 'safety net or equity principle, such
that a minimum threshold of privacy is available to all'.^^ Yet no
further elaboration is forthcoming of where the threshold is to be
placed or which categories of data should lay within the net deemed
private. Rule is aware of the complexity of the problem, recognising
'that there are no "natural limits" to areas of social life which might
become subject to monitoring and that any specified zone of privacy is
dependent on changing societal interpretation.^! Importantly, he is also
aware that the designation of 'personal papers', a term he adopts from
the influential American Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC)
report of the late 1970's and a long-standing legal term covering private
data, rests on the dangerously inadequate defining principle, that of
individual ownership linked to privately owned space. Rule as well as
the PPSC consider this to be an insufficient safeguard for data now
stored at numerous institutional locations and subject to rapid exchange.
Rather than pursue the illusory goal of finding some universal ground
of privacy or the formulation of theoretically endless rules of access and
control to information generated and distributed without the consent or
knowledge of data subjects, Rule resorts to traditional solutions, the
establishment of legal ownership of personal data:
private citizens...should have rights over the commercial use
SÛMarx (1990) op cit, p.lOl.
SlRule (1989) op ciu p.38

of filed information about themselves akin to that enjoyed by
celebrities over the commercial use of their public personae.
Information in data files should not be sold or exchanged for
value without permission of the individual; private individuals
should be able to withhold, give away, or indeed sell rights to
commercial use of their files^^
Marx proposes the principle of 'joint ownership' between both parties as
a way regulating the dissemination of data, maintaining that any profit
made in the sale of data must also be shared.83 Gray also calls for more
clearly defined ownership of personal data, demanding corporate
liability for misuse and inaccuracy.^^ A solution which is also taken up
by Laudon who maintains that a 'price mechanism' attached to
personally owned data would force large data gathering organisations to
include the potential costs of surveillance within their overall budgeting
targets and may operate as an economic inducement to its scaling
down.85

(vi) The Limitations of the Liberal Interpretation
Surprisingly, the preceding liberal analyses of contemporary mass
surveillance have not been subject to any sustained criticism. In fact,
what has eventuated in the course of 25 years of surveillance studies has
been the parallel construction of two explanatory frameworks emerging
from different theoretical traditions and with few points of overlap or
contestation. Theorists of the radical camp (see part two) have operated
from a different perspective, attempting to relate the techniques of mass
surveillance to the changing dynamics of capital accumulation and the
manner in which these techniques are embedded in the continuing
transformation and intensification of capitahst social domination. Rule's
work remains the exception. In Rule privacy continues to be the
measure of the social effects of surveillance while the requirements of
organisational, but not explicitly capitahst, control are identified as its
underlying cause.
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The absence of contestation between liberal and radical interpretations
has had a number of effects. Firstly, the socially important goals of
individual freedom and autonomy, shared by both camps, have been
colonised by the liberal privacy interpretation. This has resulted in the
widely accepted assumption that the maintenance of privacy, as
constructed in liberal theory, is the sole method of protecting the
universally accepted ideals of freedom and autonomy. Secondly, the
concept of privacy is a central element in the abstract architecture of
liberal social and political theory which formalises and equalises
individuals as bearers of universal rights. It also carefully divides the
private realm of the individual from a broader public realm and
articulates a set of permissible interactions between the two. This
process leads to the third effect of liberal theory, that of the removal of
surveillance as a practice from the dynamics of capitalist social
relations. Explanations of the rise of mass surveillance are linked to the
expansion and bureaucratisation of an undifferentiated public realm
which intrudes into the equally undifferentiated private world of the
individual. Privacy then, is an ideological shell which has been dropped
over the complex social and material processes which shape the
conditions of the life of the individual and which serves to mystify the
role mass surveillance plays in the manipulation and discipline of the
individual in the direct and indirect (in the role of the state) interests of
capital. Before examining the more radical expositions of this role we
must first explore in more detail how privacy de-limits surveillance
studies.
From the perspectives outlined above, privacy is constructed as sets of
spatialised enclosures surrounding and cutting across the individual
body. From the work of Westin and his followers we can identify four
fields of privacy. Territorial privacy is the space around the body and is
associated essentially with the domestic scene of the private home. It is
the site of the important functions of intimacy, seclusion, solitude and
the free expression of sexuality. Physical privacy is bounded by the
surface of the body and its clothing. A protective zone which encloses
bodily function, the interiority of the body and its biological
functioning, and bodily display. Psychological privacy is the protection
of the internal space of the mind as the site of desires, imagination,

fears, obsessions, and the formulation of ideas. Finally, the privacy of
discourse is the right of individual control over inter-personal and
individual-to-organisation communication. The right to 'limit and
protect' the circulation of personal information. Westin also claims that
the body in motion should be ascribed the rights of territorial and
physical privacy for the protection of individual anonymity in the public
sphere.
Surveillance is interpreted as intrusion into these enclosures for the
extraction of information regarding their contents. And is considered
dangerous (although partially necessary) because the sources of
individuality - liberty, autonomy, seclusion, anonymity, solitude,
reserve, and self-evaluation - are nurtured within these boundaries.
According to the political ideology of liberalism, surveillance also
becomes dangerous if it effects an imbalance between the public and
private spheres. Studies after Westin have shown how each zone has
been affected. In the territorial zone, surveillance technologies can
identify residential location, periods of home occupancy, occupant social
structure, patterns of consumption, occupant financial status, income
levels, types of welfare received, driving licence and registration
details, and criminal histories. Physical privacy has succumbed to a
battery of surveillance technologies of the body, which include
biological and chemical identifiers, fingerprinting techniques, retinal
and brain wave patterns, voice recognition technologies, identification
of illegal substance use and medical details of body performance and
intemal health. The privacy of the mind has been invaded by a range of
psychological assessment devices including polygraphs, IQ testing, brain
wave analysis and various therapeutic techniques. Privacy of discourse
is undermined by miniaturised listening devices, telephone monitoring
techniques and the confiscation of discourse data generated in individual
to organisation contacts by the organisation itself.86
Studies explored the effects of computerisation - the convergence of
surveillance information into a single digital form; its increasing
mobility, portability and ease of storage; the increasing deterritorialisation of data as it migrates away from the zones of enclosure
in which it is generated and is subject to increasingly unfettered
86see Marx (1988) op cit, pp.208-216 for a fascinating catalogue of new technological developments.

transmission and exchange between data dependent organisations. For
privacy theorists the combined result has been a 'chilling' effect on
personal behaviour, inhibiting free expression and compromising
individual autonomy.
A range of solutions have been advocated, and partially instituted,
centred on the call for legally protected rights of personal ownership of
data and the enforcement of the fair information principles of consent,
access and the right of correction.
Thus, for the privacy theorists, surveillance data is closely correlated
with the structure of private life itself. It is a method of 'exteriorising
the private self (Mowshowitz), providing a 'data image' of the interior
scenes of private life (Marx), rendering a 'transparent world' (Miller).
This widespread assumption has not been explored even though the
attempt to distinguish personal from statistical data should have been a
warning that there are difficulties in clearly defining where 'personal'
data begins and ends. It is clear that privacy does not inhere in the
content or structure of the pieces of data themselves. The crucial
question is how certain pieces of data, or sets of related data, are given
the role as windows into private life and in the process become
embodiments of an invasion into privacy and, by inference, undermine
the cherished functions of liberty or autonomy. The answer is that they
are simply coded as private within privacy and legal discourse. For
example, some data is given a high status privacy coding because it is
believed to disclose attributes of what Westin would call the inner zones
of the private self, the sites of intimacy, sexual expression, and
disclosure of the body. Medium level coding might include the privacy
of religious practice, personal medical history, political practices and
beliefs, or the details of personal finance. Whereas an outer zone might
consist of daily transactional tokens such as bus tickets, purchase
receipts etc. In short, any classification of data is completely arbitrary
as is the criteria for admittance. There is nothing inherently private
about data related to an individual. This is a contentious claim but can
be defended in two ways. Firstly, even if one accepts that data gathered
on an individual invades his/her privacy in some respect depending on
what zone of privacy it illuminates, it can still be argued that the great
majority of data gathered on individuals represents only the outermost

zones. For example, see figs. 1 and 2. Fig.l is a breakdown of
government and state personal information categories compiled in 1970
while Fig.2 represents a typical file in the notorious direct marketing
industry.
Figl : Typical categories of Information Stored in Databanks of Local and State
Governments in the United States^^
1. Personal identity data
2. Personal employment data
3. Welfare data
4. Health data
5. Tax data
6. Personal education data
7. Voter registration data
8. Licence and pennit data
9. Law enforcement data

10. Civil action data
11. Probation / parole data
12. Confinement data
13. Registered personal property
14. Vehicle registration data
15. Real estate data
16. Residence owner / occupant
data
17. Street section data

There is nothing here which can be said to 'exteriorise' scenes or
attributes from the zones of intimacy or seclusion, never mind the 'core
self with its 'dreams, hopes, fears and prayers beyond sharing'.
Fig 2: R.L. Polk & Co. Individual Household Data (1990)^^
1. Household income estimate
2. Sex of head of household
3. Type of dwelling unit
4. Month/ year of birth
5. Marital status
6. Home owner
7. No. of children under 18
8. No. of persons employed
9. No. of persons in household
10. Occupation of head of household
11. Spouse's name
12. Birth / high school / college data

13. Mail responsive household
14. Length of residence
15. Possession of telephone /
telephone number
16. Year / model / make of car
17. No. of cars owned
18. No. of cars purchased new
since 1984
19. Move data
20. Ethnic and religious coding

Nevertheless, it might still be argued that personal data such as medical
details and criminal history will undermine the function of selfevaluation and have a chilling effect on individual autonomy, especially
in conditions of error, inaccuracies, and acontextual usage.
87 Martin and Norman op cit, p.268. Of course, no single databank will contain data under all these
categories.
88David Shepard Associates Ine, The New Direct Marketing (Homewood, Illinois, 1990), appendix,
p.415.

Furthermore, one cannot deny that a small part of mass surveillance
involves the gathering of unambiguous 'intelligence' data such as details
of personal religious practices, sexual orientation and practice, political
beliefs and affiliations. It must surely be admitted that these sort of
intrusions push deep into the realm of personal privacy. But is this
actually the case? Ironically, Campbell and Connor, in a brief aside
amidst a general defence of privacy, point to an altemative reading of
this claim. They argue that many oppositional sub-groups in modem
society, for example, youth criminal offenders, wear their surveillance
tags of criminal identity as badges of pride.89 In fact, a nimiber of social
groups, traditionally targets of state and police surveillance, for
example, gays and lesbians, ethnic minority groups, and political
radicals, actively recast the pejorative labels attached to them,
challenging attempts to marginalise and silence them. The same is true
of those medically categorised as AIDS victims or the physically and
mentally disabled. Rather than isolated individuals defending some
abstract right of privacy through legal means in order to re-establish
personal autonomy 'chilled' by state surveillance practices, this
collective resistance is aimed at altering the balance of social power in
order to extend their autonomy and freedom. Protecting privacy, as
constructed by the privacy theorists, is largely irrelevant in this
struggle.
This suggests that the purposes of surveillance are more closely related
to the management of individuals, the effectiveness of which rehes on
the position of both surveillance operators and victims in the overall
structure of socio-economic and political power. As we wiU see below
ownership and control of the means of information and communication
is becoming crucial in this struggle.
Secondly, the rise of statistical data surveillance further impairs the
privacy analysis and confirms a broader social control interpretation.
Westin initially raised the issue of how clever mixes of personal
psychological data and broader statistical data could form predictive
models of how certain classes of people could be expected to behave in
certain sets of circumstances of interest to organisations. Such data
could then be used to screen out undesirable individuals from
^^Campbell and Connor op cit, p.21

participation in a particular organisation's services. This theme has been
a recurring feature of studies of surveillance. Linowes addressing the
practices of credit surveillance, maintains that an ever greater
proportion of purely statistical data is now being used for the assessment
of individual credit worthiness based on categories of age, occupation,
and demographic criteria. Dunn notes the growing range of state-based
statistical surveillance, such as census details and crime information
statistics. A feature also of increasing importance to the practices of
marketing surveillance which utilise complex forms of statistically based
demographic and psychographic data. This further weakens the
argument that mass surveillance is a form of personal intrusion. Even it
is accepted that there is a meaningful distinction between private and
statistical data, a division which is poorly defined and is not supported
by evidence of the nature of 'private' data gathered by organisations, the
emergence of purely statistical surveillance can not be related to
personal intrusion in any direct way. Personal privacy does not play any
role in this form of surveillance and it must be assessed on grounds
other than that of intrusion or invasion.
Nevertheless, statistical mass surveillance has generally been colonised
by the privacy debate. Its effects are measured by the privacy theorists
as distortions of individuality and in terms of constraints on personal
freedom and autonomy. Westin and Wessel feared the chilling effect on
individual behaviour and the stereotyping of individuals according to
categories which may be inaccurate when related to specific individuals
which not only affects access to state and commercial services but may
render them susceptible to dangerous criminal categorisations. Marx
notes the shift in poHce surveillance 'from targeting a specific suspect to
a categorical suspicion of everyone' and how this induces 'selfmonitoring' of behaviour.90 However, he refrains from exploration of
the social dynamics of this form of surveillance-based control and
restates familiar privacy concerns of liberty and rights of the individual.
Thirdly, it is clear from the above that there are a number of
unexamined epistemological problems involved in the very principle
that so-called 'personal data' is either a transparent representation of the
scenes and attributes of the private realm or, more problematically, is
90Marx (1988) op ciu p.219

equated with the private realm itself. The ambiguity and slippages
between sign and referent are now widely accepted and arguments for
transparency need to show more clearly how such documentational
representations connect with the spaces of privacy. The documentational
artefacts which are said to illuminate the private realm are merely
'traces' left from the interface between surveillance operator and data
subject.91 In addition, the decision about what constitutes the content of
these traces is always taken by the operators of surveillance themselves,
and are linked to various organisational needs. Whether or not a trace
contravenes privacy is immaterial to surveillance operators. We shall
see later that these traces are crucial for the purposes of individual
discipline and represent an important method of deepening social
control in capitalist societies.
However, considering the difficulties of equating surveillance with the
invasion of privacy, it must be said that nowhere in the privacy
literature is it maintained that the sole purpose of data surveillance is to
invade privacy. Yet, the interpretation of its effects are limited to
precisely this. The result is a narrowing of interpretation based on the
fiction of intrusion and a suppression of the social control aspects of
surveillance. This is in spite of Westin's own, unexplored, declaration
that 'surveillance is obviously a fundamental means of social
control...without such surveillance, society could not enforce its norms
or protect its citizens'.^^ Once again, however, this theme is scarcely
examined.
Of course, privacy theorists may argue that it is not so much the space
itself which is important but the maintenance and nourishment of
individuality that privacy affords and that the universal social goals of
freedom, autonomy, and self-expression are undermined by excessive
surveillance. This is undeniably true, but another important aspect of
91 The concept of 'trace' is similar to that used by Latour in his studies of textual inscriptions
generated in scientific laboratory practice. The bars, graphs, lines, and dots, said to constitute
experimental evidence and which purport to represent an objective reality below the text, actually
operate as pseudo referents which merely reinforce the assumption that text corresponds with reality.
The association between documentation and an underlying private realm is based on a similar process
except that in this case the private realm is not something discovered, and then represented in the text,
it is already assumed. Documentational traces which constitute 'personal information', nevertheless, are
believed to operate as transparent markers of the private realm. See Latour's discussions of traces and
inscriptions in B. Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the Worid', in K. Knorr Cetina and
M. Mulkay (eds.). Science Observed (Sage, London, 1982), p. 161
92westin (1967) op cit, p.67

the privacy interpretation is a refusal to address the manner in which
the concrete expression of these ideals is socially contingent, linked as
they are to the uneven application of social power in specific socioeconomic contexts. In fact, the satisfaction of these goals is not
dependent on the surrounding privacy shell as constructed by the
privacy theorists. However, the socio-political narrative of
constitutional liberalism which shapes the privacy interpretation closely
articulates and inter-relates the concepts of privacy and freedom in ways
which bracket out their social contingency. It also shapes and limits
answers to the broader questions of why surveillance is intensifying,
expanding and becoming more technologically sophisticated.
Westin's initial commitment to a civil liberties interpretation of
contemporary surveillance was a formative moment for proceeding
studies. Nearly all the privacy studies have adopted a framework of
classical liberalism which has resulted in the application of a range of
purely formal concepts intruding unexamined into empirical surveys of
surveillance. This has meant that studies of modem surveillance have
been structured within a conceptual framework of eighteenth century
liberalism derived from the historical experience of early
entrepreneurial capitalism. The inadequacy of this approach in
contemporary conditions of highly bureaucratised, transnational capital
has surprisingly gone unnoticed.
There are two basic principles of classical liberalism which are upheld
by the privacy theorists which might be termed the formalisation of the
individual and the formal symmetry^'^ of social power. These two
categories provide the ideological content of the privacy analysis of
surveillance. In addition a third principle, which has been called 'the
crisis of liberalism', establishes the grounds on which the rise and
menace of surveillance is interpreted.
The Formalisation of the Individual
A universal feature of privacy narratives is the construction of the
individual as a generic category. One that assigns an equal complement
93The term belongs to Goldstene. See P.N. Goldstene, The Collapse of the Liberal Empire (Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1977), p. 15.

of natural rights (liberty, privacy, property, estate) to all irrespective of
class, education, race, gender. A process of de-contextualisation which
submerges not only the particularity of the individual but abstracts
him/her from any determinate social context. This common feature of
liberal theory has a number of effects on the social analysis of
surveillance. Firstly, surveillance is equalised in its effects, a linear
process of intrusion into a shell of privacy in which the rights of the
individual are lodged. Secondly, individuals as abstract bundles of rights
are transferable to any point on the social fabric. As recipients of
surveillance whether in the workplace, in the operation of the welfare
system, through their business and financial transactions or their
political activities, the effects of surveillance are the same. There are a
number of clear examples of this in the privacy literature. Marx, in his
study of new surveillance technology in the workplace, proceeds from a
purely privacy interpretation.^^ In doing so he disengages surveillance
from its central role in the maintenance of the structure of social power
operating at the level of production. It is used to intensify the authority
of capital over labour through the perpetual increase in the productivity
of labour secured through a mix of labour-displacing technologies and
an increasingly disciplined and compliant workforce. The privacy of
workers had long been compromised before the establishment of
electronic surveillance. The individual in production is not a citizen
with all the attendant rights of liberal theory - privacy, autonomy,
liberty, dignity - suddenly compromised by new technological practices,
but a recipient of historically changing expressions of social power
dictated by the requirements of capitalist industrial competition.
Electronic surveillance is simply the latest strategy in a history of social
exploitation.95 Similarly, Westin, Miller and Linowes' references to new
surveillance practices at the level of consumption whether it be credit
determination, EFTS, or direct marketing, are shaped by privacy
concems.96 No consideration is given to their role in the stimulation and
discipline of consumption driven by systemic needs of product
expansion and diversification.97 Martin's analysis of surveillance on the
94see p.24 above.
95This disciplinary dimension is also overlooked by Rule in his concern over new threats to privacy in
the workplace, even though he accepts that surveillance is being utilised to monitor and improve
worker performance. Rule (1989) op cit, pp.21-22.
96 Westin (1967) op ciu pp.162-165; Miller (1971) op cit, p.84-87; Linowes, see above p.24.
97 Westin has recently published a checklist of measures which companies can take to improve
consumer privacy, based on traditional fair information principles. Although he is concerned at the rise

road also misses a number of specific aspects of social control through
its concentration on the invasion of privacy. For example, one might
examine how vehicle identification and route guidance systems are
linked directly to the economic power of transnational automobile
producers and indirectly to the wider systemic needs of capital
accumulation. They are forms of surveillance which secure a number of
definite benefits for capital. K, as Martin suggests, they are linked to a
user-pays system of road use, they help to remove those unable to pay
and may progressively hand prime-time road use over to traffic
essential to the circulation of capital such as labour, conmiodities and
consumers. A process which speeds up the circulation of capital by
reducing un-economic road use while at the same time providing a
private-vehicle solution to traffic congestion.^s Finally, in Campbell and
Connor's study of intensifying bureaucratic surveillance operated by the
British state in the 1980's abstract privacy concems predominate and no
connection is made between surveillance and the crisis conditions of
British capitalism and the establishment of oppressive forms of social
policing taking place at many points in British s o c i e t y
The overall effect of this formalising and de-contextualising of the
individual is an ignorance of the uneven distribution of surveillance
across society. It leaves many questions unanswered. Why do people
gathered at certain locations or involved in certain activities (in the
factory, as welfare recipients, or targeted consumers) attract a greater
density of surveillance than elsewhere? Are certain groups of 'citizens'
clustered around these high density surveillance locations? If so, what
are the implications? What are the links between surveillance and the
configurations of social power in the decisive sectors of capitalism production, consumption, social reproduction, state administration?
of consumer surveillance there is no attempt to discern why it is expanding nor any analysis of its
intended social effect beyond its supposed link to the extension of customer choice. A.F. Westin,
'Managing Consumer Privacy Issues - a Checklist', Transnational Data and Communications Report,
July/August, 1991,pp.34-35.
9^Scott, in a study of the same technologies, does mention various social control aspects. She notes
the deepening managerial control over transport fleet performance made possible by the transference of
traditional driver skills (the monitoring of driver and engine performance, traffic conditions, stops made,
and route taken) to in-built technological control systems. Although some mention is made of the
benefits to capital in this process - notably the increase in relative surplus value - the issue is not taken
up in any detail. P. Scott,'Road Transport Informatics: ChallengingtiieFreedom of the Roads?',
Prometheus, Vol.9, No.2, 1991, pp.308-309
99A theme taken up in the work of Stuart Hall. See, for example, S. Hall, Thatcherism - A New
Stage?', Marxism Today, February, 1980. pp.26-27

Such questions are never considered because capitalism, as an actually
existing socio-economic system, is entirely absent. The removal of such
questions by ideological decree once again reinforces the privacy effect
of surveillance and minimises the aspect of social control. Thirdly, these
procedures of formalisation limit the range of solutions to the problem
of surveillance to only one, the extension of legally enshrined forms of
protection.
I

The Formal Symmetry of Social Power
As Goldstene has pointed out, the formal architecture of liberal theory
is designed to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of single
individuals. In each social realm - the economic and the political - a
pluralisation of power is maintained. A series of constitutionally
designated checks and balances which reconcile the passion for conquest
and distinction inscribed in all men. In the economic sphere
concentrations of power are avoided by the rule of the free market in
which the the laws of competition produce an equalising effect. Sealed
of from the economic sphere is the realm of politics, which reconciles
the mass of conflicting private interests for the maintenance of overall
stability. The political sphere is characterised by a careful
compartmentalisation of authority between legislature, executive and
judiciary which mitigates against the concentration of state power. lOO in
fact, the state is viewed as a necessary evil but when left unconstrained
becomes a dangerous threat to the rights of the individual. A more
general bifurcation cuts across these realms, that between the public and
the private. The public sphere is not only portrayed as a disinterested
reconciler of private conflict but the provider of the conditions for
individual freedom/rights. While the private sphere itself is
depoliticised, sealed from the arena of formal political practice. This
means that the so-called reahn of the individual, with its formal rights
and duties, is often extended into the economic sphere (the private right
of property, the right of contract between economic agents) resulting in
the minimisation of other important relations of social power,
particularly, as we have seen, that of the struggle between labour and
capital. The overall effect is the simplification of social structure into a
lOOcoldstene op cit, pp.11-15

basic dichotomy between the individual, constructed in terms of
constitutional rights, and the demands of a public sphere. This general
public/private bifurcation results, in the privacy literature, to an
undifferentiated co-mingling of state and conmiercial organisations,
maintaining various levels of surveillance which invade to some
measurable extent individual privacy. All the early studies contain
examples from across this divide. It never occurs to privacy theorists
that surveillance mounted from within the state, the commercial sector,
or production might serve different purposes and be adapted to
different organisational ends.
In addition, in this construction of formalised abstract individuals,
located in a carefuUy balanced symmetry of social power the important
concepts of 'freedom' and 'autonomy' are also decontextualised and thus
rendered purely formal and abstract. As in the case of privacy, each
individual is presumed to have access to a standardised quota of freedom
and autonomy and challenges to this quota through excessive
surveillance is presumably something which afflicts each individual in
the same way. Once again, it does not seem to occur to the privacy
theorists that the expression of freedom and autonomy is dependent on
an array of social factors such as class location, level of political
influence, and access to education and sources of information which are
crucial for individual empowerment.
Finally, in the privacy literature the shifting balance between the rights
of the individual and the expansion of bureaucratic surveillance is
played out within a broader narrative which is commonly referred to as
the 'crisis of liberalism'. This is centred on the identification of a
number of social and technological processes, which in combination are
massifying and standardising modem society, replacing the unique
individual with a kind of featureless social atom.ioi Typical explanations
for this are the problem of uncontrolled technological change and the
lOlpor an overview of the 'crisis of liberalism' thesis see, T.V. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd
Edition (WW Norton and Co, New York, 1979), pp.22-35; and Goldstene, op cit, pp.42-54. Lowi
maintains classical liberal theory has been undermined by the modem transition to state and corporate
administration which has supplanted individual, automatic, self-control by conscious, organised,
economic and social planning. Goldstene in a similar fashion blames the 'emergence of organised and
co-ordinated knowledge', in which planning 'replaces the spontaneity of the market'; a new social order
in which the 'power of the order is secreted within a plurality of technostructures, pluralised in
themselves, beyond identity and beyond the balance of liberal control'. A process driven by deindividualised, organisational men, of 'specialist competence', and displaying a corporate loyalty.

rise of enormous bureaucratic structures in order to deal with the
gathering 'complexity' of social life. Because liberal theory is
predicated on the denial of social theory beyond a commitment to a
pristine early capitalist entrepreneurialism, of free individuals in an
unfettered marketplace, the centralisation and corporatisation of capital,
the organisation of labour and the expansion of the state are threatening
developments that must be explained in ways that do not challenge the
dominant theory. To suit this end technological change is seen as a
natural process which impinges, unexplained, from without, rather than
as a crucial tool for expansion and intensification of the social power of
c a p i t a l . 102 Likewise the movement to conditions of 'social complexity' is
left unspecified, free of any particular sources of determination.
Mowshowitz' work is a prime example of this. Although he explicitly
warns of the dangers of using deterministic models of the rise to
complexity, such as biological and mathematical systems,he can offer
no alternative explanation of why individual mobility is increasing or
the why the social division of labour is deepening. Moreover, his call
for a voluntaristic return from complexity to a more simplified social
scale merely deflects a proper social explanation. Miller maintains that
modem society is undergoing a 'cybernetic revolution': in which
'technological improvements in information-handling capability have
been followed by a tendency to engage in more extensive manipulation
and analysis of recorded data. This in turn has motivated the collection
of data pertaining to a larger number of v a r i a b l e s ' . H o w e v e r , it
seems that this feedback loop is determined by nothing other than
natural technical change itself.
The liberal perspective of surveillance is based on a series of linkages
which connect the individual ownership of privacy with the right to, and
the possibility of, freedom. A freedom which can only be realised in a
particular architecture of political and social power, that of
constitututional liberalism and laissez faire capitalism. Yet there have
lO^Bennett has noted the tendency toward a technologically determinist explanation of the expansion of
surveillance evident in the work of the privacy theorists. An explanation 'based on the assumption that
a technological imperative is at work and that public policy can only mitigate its worst effects'.
However, he does not explore any alternative explanations. C.J. Bennett,'Computers, Personal Data,
and Theories of Technology: Comparative Approaches to Privacy Protection in the 1990's', Science,
Technology, and Human Values, Vol.16, No.l, 1991, p.58
lOSj^owshowitz, op cit, p.228
lO^Miller op ciu p.35.

been attempts to develop alternative modes of analysis of surveillance
which are not trapped in this framework. Parts two and three will take
up and critically review some of these approaches.

PART TWO: TOWARD A CRITICAL SOCIAL ANALYSIS
OF SURVEILLANCE
(i) From the Individual to the Organisation - Surveillance as
the Core of Organisational Control
The Work of Rule and his Colleagues
The work of James Rule and his colleagues over the past two decades
represents an adjunct to the privacy-based analyses of the study of
surveillance in favour of a more rigourous attempt at providing a
comprehensive sociology of s u r v e i l l a n c e . However, there are
similarities. Rule's work in some ways stands adjacent to the privacy
theories, substituting organisations for individuals as the primary unit of
analysis and in the construction of a framework of organisational,
rather than individual, pluralism.
Rule's critique of Westin and the early surveillance studies is centred on
the belief that Westin's idea of privacy is often markedly different than
that commonly used in discourses of daily life. We have seen that
Westin's conceptualisation of privacy, composed of specific zones and
associated states and functions, is generally territorialised and fetishised
into a form of property. We have interpreted this as a central
component of the abstract, universal rights of classical liberalism, the
political ideology which guides all of his work including the attempt to
incorporate the rise of informational privacy. The coding of certain
forms of communication and documentation as private is important to
Westin because it allows them to be assessed in terms of specific rights
of ownership and control. Rule is critical of this framework because it
locks Westin into purely regulatory and legalistic solutions to the
problem of expanding surveillance. For Westin the defence of privacy
can only be maintained through the ascription to the individual of
definite rights of ownership and control. According to Rule, he is then
105J,B. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (Allen and Lane, London, 1973); J. Rule, D.
M c A t o , L. Steams and D. Uglow, The Politics of Privacy (Elsevier, New York, 1980); J. Rule, D.
McAdam, L. Steams, D. Uglow, Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information-Oriented Society',
in LJ. Hoffman ed. computers and Privacy in the Next Decade (Academic Press Inc. New York, 1980);
J.B. Rule, D. McAdam, L. Steams and D. Uglow, 'Documentary Identification and Mass Surveillance
in the United States', Social Problems, Vol.31, No.2, December, 1983.

[this] makes it plausible to contend that privacy is protected
in personal-data systems if only people are accorded some
say in the treatment of their i n f o r m a t i o n i ^ ^
Conceding that there is 'no natural limit to surveillance', Rule believes
this plainly contradicts both the public interpretation of privacy and the
manner in which its effects are dealt with.
Throughout his work Rule contends that the explosion of data
surveillance is endemic to the bureaucratic-organisational dynamics of
contemporary society and at some point an 'aesthetic reaction' to the
deepening intrusions into privacy and autonomy must take precedence
over the permanent procedural guarantees of protection. This implies
that attempts must be made to limit surveillance rather than merely
regulate it.^^^ The proliferation of data surveillance must be challenged
at the level of bureaucratic structure and practice. Privacy theorists,
unable or unwilling to attend to the broader sociological dimension, and
entrenched in legalistic and procedural forms of individual protection,
only succeed in 'domesticating' the privacy issue
most discussion among policy-makers and scholars is in the
elimination of particular sets of abusive practices....making
surveillance systems work better, on the assumption that both
organisations and individuals ...shared an interest in achieving
the ends for which the systems were created - shut[ting] out
the examination of the larger desirabihty of the growing power
of surveillance systems in g e n e r a l .
Rule's own analysis is set against a landscape of interacting, cooperating
and competing organisations which have elaborated complex modes of
control over their individual clientele. The analysis proceeds from two
separate perspectives which when taken in combination form an
overarching global conception of the nature of modern mass
surveillance societies.
The level of the individual organisation
lO^Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy, op cit, p.82.
ibid., p.79
lO^Ruie et al Preserving Individual Autonomy...', op cit, p.73.

An important feature of organisational pluralism, amply demonstrated
by Rule's work, is the reduction of diverse social groups to a single,
generic classification and an accompanying universalisation of their
practices. In this way Rule clusters together 'families, sects, states,
business interests, religious sects'i^^^ and he may just as well include
trade unions, political parties and schools. Against this an equally
similar and undifferentiated clientele. All organisations act to extend
control, by 'reaching out' to their 'client periphery', 'developing
systems for coping with uncertainty in their environments', via a battery
of surveillance-based practices. ^^^
Documentational surveillance is central to the identification and location
of clients, the first step of the control process. In their study of six
documentational systems in the US, Rule and his colleagues found that
'tokens of self-identification' - principally passports and birth
certificates - were the primary means by which organisations secure
identity of individual clientele, they are also the generating source of
other personal documents. High integrity identification and on-going
locator mechanisms provide the basis on which organisational 'powers
of control' can be extended, m
Organisations 'secure the compliance' of clients through the application
of rule-based procedures and regulations which 'enforce' the behaviour
required of them. The administration of consent cannot simply rely on
the goodwill of clients in following standard procedures. Rule's early
study of five large bureaucratic systems showed that they 'staged' their
surveillance operations around the enforcement of client control based
on a continuum of control measures ranging from sanction to exclusion.
Mechanisms of sanction might be purely symboUc, such as wamings,
reprimands or punishment in the form of fines and charges. Exclusion
may be partial in the suspension of services or total in the expulsion of
the client from the system.The systematic application of sanction and
exclusion serve as extra sources of data surveillance, mediating
continuing and future chent relations with the o r g a n i s a t i o n . 112
109Rule (1973) op cit, p.20
llORule et al "Preserving Individual Autonomy...', op cit, p.67.
l l l R u l e (1983) op cit, p.222
ll^Rule (1973) op cit, p.22

Rule draws an important distinction between bejwéen the application of
the techniques of physical surveillance suitable in small scale, local
communities and the massive documentary systems necessary for
securing compliance from a 'mobile, anonymous public'. He advances
five conditions which make documentary surveillance the only effective
means of social control: when the client base of an organisation has
'become too large and anonymous for face-to-face acquaintance'; for the
enforcement of organisational rules; when the application of rules
requires complex decision-making regarding client entitlements; when
the application of rules require highly discriminating decision-making
from a mass of detailed personal information; and the linking of each
client with the documentation arising from his/her past behaviour.
The maintenance of client consent, the provision of services, the
minimisation of deviant behaviour and the overall administration of
'normalised' system of relations between the organisation and client
leads to a simultaneous intensification of decision-making power and
documentary monitoring as past deeds must be linked with current
status and behaviour, and both enter into future decisions.
Organisational powers of control cannot extend and multiply without
limit and it can be inferred from Rule that individual organisations must
operate within an overall economy of surveillance. Rule sees a
continuing dialectic between the need to permanently extend and
intensify surveillance against an opposing constraint of containing
operating costs. The 'surveillance capacity' of an organisation is
improved by multiplying the 'points of contact' between it and the client
within its defined operational 'jurisdiction'. The density and range of
surveillance is shaped by the organisations expectations of the client in
accordance with the type of service offered and the rules and
regulations which need to be maintained. Improving surveillance
capacity increases the visibility of the client, drawing in data considered
to be vital to the requirements of the organisation, whether it be
residential location, occupation, financial status, income details,
transactional patterns, or material assets. As personal information is
taken to be the 'raw data' of decision-making, increasing its power of
ll^Rule et al Preserving Individual Autonomy...' (1980) op cit, p.68

discrimination, the proliferation of contact points often exceeds the
strict needs of the organisation. According to Rule, this data imperative
drives most organisations toward the collection of additional, nonessential personal data which feeds into subsequent decision-making
nevertheless.
The costs of expanding surveillance capacity are offset in a number of
ways. An important method of managing the costs of expansion is
through the use of computerised data systems and telecommunications
contacts. Writing in the 1970s and early 1980s, Rule and his colleagues
were only just beginning to appreciate the new forms of high integrity
identification and client tracking mechanisms now in operation, and the
instantaneous exchange of data between organisational points and
increasingly with the client herself, As the studies mentioned in part
one show, routine, automatic, systematic electronic monitoring is now a
feature of many organisations, extending surveillance capacity
enormously. The centralisation and standardisation of data is another
important technique. Like Westin, Rule appreciated the efficiency gains
made through the centralisation of data collection and organisational
structure. However, these early studies did not foresee how data is
now rapidly networked between central points and widely distributed
locations. A process allows the organisational flexibility of maintaining
central control alongside increasingly, local decision-making facilitated
by horizontal data flows across an organisation's structure.
Organisations can exhibit both centralising and localising features in a
global calculation of control. Rule also identifies more traditional forms
of bureaucratic standardisation of operating procedures. The
standardising of documentation and application of rules, regulations,
sanctions and punishments helps to reduce the uncertainty of individual
circumstances and introduces conditions of faimess and equity in the
treatment of clienteles. This helps condense data into standard categories
considered important to the organisation. Rule also points to the
establishment of statistical techniques such as data scanning and random
sampling for the construction of client profiles employed to 'narrow the
attention' of systems dealing with clienteles so large that decisionll^Rule (1973) op cit, pp.289-292 and 301-302; see also Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy, (1980)
op cit, p.49
ll^See the discussion of technological changes in ibid., pp.62-3.
ll^Rule (1973) op ciu p.285 and 302

making derived from the mass of personalised contacts must be
supplemented with statistical surveillance derived from both publicly
available data and composite constructs of data previously accumulated
by the organisation.ii^
Inter-organisational cooperation and the creation of the mass
surveillance society
The dialectic between maximising control and limiting costs is also
addressed on a inter-organisational level. Rule's studies show that
organisations routinely 'co-operate' to improve their own surveillance
capacity. Client data initially shaped by a discrete organisational context,
but of more universal application - modes of identification, client
location, financial status, or other services subscribed to - are routinely
exchanged among organisations in order to bolster control over their
jurisdictions. In addition, the merging and matching of data limits the
chances of clients 'escaping' from the wider inter-organisational system
of control. Clients moving through separate jurisdictions can be more
effectively monitored in this way.ii^ The tagging of data with personal
identifiers is a useful tool for the placing of contextually discrete data in
an overall pool of resources which can be utilised by potentially all the
organisations participating in the system.
According to Rule, the seemingly permanent extension of surveillance
capacity and the growing 'symbiosis' of data gathering through interorganisational cooperation, is producing a mass surveillance society
based on a 'cumulative change in the relations between the centres of of
social power and their peripheries' Individuals are increasingly caught
in webs of dependency on distant organisations. As the points of contact
between organisation and client multiply, individual responsibility and
control over the immediate conditions of social life is absorbed into
organisational administration of services which demand compliance and
constant accountability. This means that many of the informal
relationships previously arranged at a local community level are reestablished and transformed by impersonal bureaucracies. This process
l i s ^ m , p.303

reduces individuals to the status of anonymous agents in need of constant
identification and observation by means of d o c u m e n t a t i o n .
Limiting surveillance
Earlier we noted Rule's rejection of the 'efficiency criterion' assumed
by the privacy theorists. However, in dismissing the idea that privacy
and autonomy can be protected within a legally regulated extension of
surveillance, Rule's solution is to shift the focus of analysis from the
individual to the organisation itself. He believes there are several ways
in which this can be done. Above all it means challenging the 'ideology
of planning' which merely seeks to minimise the social problems of a
never ending extension of bureaucratic control by increasingly efficient
legal and administrative mechanisms. According to Rule, bureaucratic
planners (and liberal theorists) nearly always assume that the structure
of bureaucratic organisations and their lines of development are 'fixed
conditions' making them impervious to restructuring. This effectively
obscures potential altematives and the fact that a range of choices can be
made,
Against this perceived organisational determinism toward the
progressive extension of control, Rule argues for a 're-allocation of
resources' for the creation of a 'looser, more private world' based on
'less information-intensive ways of dealing with people'. This entails the
minimisation of highly discriminating, fine-grained decision-making by
organisations thus breaking the pattern of cumulative information
gathering and the progressive augmentation of personal records which
provides the very conditions for such data discrimination. He suggests
two inter-related methods of achieving this. Firstly, some form of
structural reduction must take place. By decentralising and locahsing the
setting for decision-making and by applying much broader categories of
service, reductions in the differences between individual cases can be
made. Presumably this will help to interrupt the information spiral that
operates as increased data gathering power feeds into ever more detailed
decision-making criteria. Secondly, as organisations proceed along these
119see Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy (1980) op cit, p. 116; and Rule (1973) op cit, pp.25-27
120Rule et al. The Politics of Privacy (1980) op cit, p. 171

simpler lines inter-organisational exchange of data could be reduced and
the possibility of a universal 'baseline' of personal information
categories could conceivably be constructed which would be adequate
for decision-making. 121
In one of his later works Rule makes the analogy between the possibility
of more localised and simplified 'social technologies of surveillance' and
the 'soft energy paths' favoured by environmentalists. Massive,
centralised surveillance systems are structured in a similar fashion to
large scale technological systems and breed the same kinds of problems
- 'enormous power in the hands of a few' and fewer opportunities for
intervention in the case of malfunction. Moreover, they are largely
destructive to their surrounding environment and operate with the
constant danger of catastrophic breakdown. Here he takes issue with the
seamless rationality of the 'technological optimists' that there is nothing
inherently beneficial in the permanent extension of 'purposive control'.
Taking a sceptical approach, Rule maintains that planning not blinded by
the imperative of technological progress could assess and rule out
dangerous potentiaHties before they are i m p l e m e n t e d . 122
Rule's vision of a looser, more private world of simplified relations
between the organisational centre and the client periphery has been
criticised by the privacy theorists. Laudon, defending classical
plurahsm, criticises Rule's assumption that organisational informational
gathering has expanded through bureaucratisation or computerisation
pointing to Westin and Baker's earlier conclusion that automation had
led to a decline in record keeping. He resolutely defends properly
regulated bureaucratic surveillance against the potential tyranny of
decentralised informal social regulation. In local settings surveillance
would be direct and physical, more personalised and free from the
objectivity that distance and standardised procedures brings. Legally
regulated surveillance operating form distant organisational sources is
seen as a safeguard of pluralist democracy, not a disruptive force.123
121/ft/J., pp.154-155
123k.C. Laudon, 'Comment on Preserving Individual Autonomy in an Information-Oriented Society',
in LJ. Hoffman (ed.). Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade (Academic Press Inc. New York,
1980), p.92

perhaps because totalitarian regimes have far more effective
means of social control, namely local systems, we find that
computerised personal databanks, say in the Soviet Union, the
Eastem Bloc, China, Argentina and Brazil, are not very well
developed at all. It may be that large, bureaucratic personal
databanks are a sufficient, adequate means of social control
only in relatively free, voluntaristic, consensual societies
because they rely so much upon individual c o m p l i a n c e .
Laudon's critique is instructive in demonstrating just how far classical
liberalism will go in defending its core assertion that no matter how
structurally complex modem capitalist societies have become, how
bureaucratised they are, any social analysis must be based on the
acceptance of the individual (rational and free) as its primary
determinant. Even if protecting the embattled theory requires the belief
that not only is the expression of liberal individualism unmolested by
the reach of bureaucratism but that it is actually enhanced by the
necessities of distance. Individuals accustomed to consensuality and
voluntarism in their social relations will freely comply with
bureaucratic requests if administered in a properly regulated manner.
For this further reduces the intrusion of petty, local meddling in their
social life.
Problems with Rule

While Rule's work offers a number of advances over earlier studies
which placed the practices of surveillance in the struggles and fears of a
cherished liberal democratic society, with the rights of individual
privacy as its centrepiece, a more rigourous critical analysis needs to
release the useful elements in Rule's studies from his own ideological
assumptions of organisational pluraHsm.
Rule's work is dominated by a pluralist perspective which undermines
some more promising applications of the concept of surveillance
capacity and the overall social dynamic of expansion and constraint in
the staging of surveillance. In Rule the organisation, as the primary unit
124//,/^., p.93

of analysis, behaves in a similar manner to sovereign individuals in
classical theory: autonomous actors pursuing projects of rationalised
self-interest. The rules of the organisational game are the preservation
of identity, coherence and autonomy through the extension of control
over the surrounding environment. The sub-set of organisational actors
who deal with largely anonymous mass clienteles as their 'raw material',
manifest practices of control based on the procedures of documentary
surveillance. Organisations are presented as generic in terms of type and
in their modes of control. They are seen as largely independent of any
determinate source of social power and thus their location in the
broader socio-economic structure is immaterial. In Rule's own case
studies organisations are drawn from the both the public and private
sector, from law enforcement, vehicle registration, credit card
providers yet all display the need to identify, locate and regulate their
client environment for the purposes of organisational consolidation and
expansion.
There is no underlying structure linking organisations together. Forms
of organisational cooperation are purely strategic, related to the
maximisation of client coverage by extending the volume and frequency
of contact in the most efficient manner. The claims that his is a
sociological analysis notwithstanding. Rule is unable to explain many of
the questions unanswered by the privacy theorists - of why surveillance
is unevenly distributed across society, and why certain individuals at
certain locations attract a greater density of surveillance.
The 'anonymous public', illuminated as targets of surveillance, are
ascribed properties - whether it be a criminal record, financial status or
credit worthiness - which are internal to the organisations needs. A
typical recipient of surveillance may be a taxpayer, a credit applicant, a
welfare client or a commercial customer, each is inculcated in sets of
regulations discrete to each organisation. As individuals move between
jurisdictions they attract the surveillance procedures particular to the
organisation involved and are often subject to data exchanges from
surrounding jurisdictions. Because each client is defined internally by
the service providing organisation and organisations themselves subsist
in conditions of independence there is no possibility of uncovering
deeper structural reasons for surveillance. Individuals are simply clients

organisation involved and are often subject to data exchanges from
surrounding jurisdictions. Because each client is defined internally by
the service providing organisation and organisations themselves subsist
in conditions of independence there is no possibility of uncovering
deeper structural reasons for surveillance. Individuals are simply clients
of a multitude of surveillance-based organisations accumulating in
number as the social system increases in size and complexity. In these
circumstances a rich and powerful property owner may be a recipient
of more organisational-surveillance contacts than an unemployed youth
from an ethnic minority group. As a social analysis of surveillance this
says nothing. These weaknesses are reflected in the general paucity of
Rule's solutions to the explosion of surveillance and the growing chains
of bureaucratic dependency. Because the explanation of surveillance is
interpreted as simple organisational intent the solution must rest on the
standardisation of organisational procedures, applicable across the
board.
A recent study that has utilised Rule's theories exemplifies some of these
problems. Clarke shows how advances in surveillance technology have
improved the monitoring ability of organisations as individuals move
through distinct jurisdictions. Instantaneous, automated, auditing and
verification techniques which draw on data from a number of separate
locations intensify organisational control, often, as in EFTS and law
enforcement, operating on a twenty four hour, real time basis. New
communications technologies now allow a more rigourous 'cross system
enforcement' making 'an individuals relationship with one organisation
dependent on his or her performance in relation to another', thereby
tightening the web of control. However, Clarke, like Rule, simply
accumulates examples of organisational control with no attempt to link
them in any systematic way. State and private sector organisations are
not differentiated in any way, all stage surveillance programmes of
varying sophistication, and cooperate in order to extend client coverage.
But there is no real distinction in purpose between credit, law
enforcement or, welfare, surveillance.

125r A. Clarke, 'Information Technology and Dataveillance', Communications of the ACM, Vol.31,
No.5, May 1988, pp.503-508.

(ii) Bringing in Capitalism 1: Surveillance and Corporate
Control
The Work of Oscar Gandy
The recent work of Oscar Gandyi26 displays some of the approaches
that guided the earlier work of Rule. Like Rule he is only indirectly
concerned with the privacy dimension of surveillance in favour of the
broader organisational dynamics which both sustain and extend it as a
social practice.
However, in contrast to Rule, Gandy's work is more attuned to the
subtle differentiation of surveillance practices, the differences in
purpose of its operations at the major sites on the landscape of advanced
capitalist societies and the diverse social effects on the recipients in these
locations. Social effects are measured in terms of the controls on human
behaviour, the obstacles to information access and the restrictions on
effective democratic participation among the populace.
Gandy sees intensified surveillance practices as an integral element of
the diffusion of information technology into the processes of capitalist
production and exchange and state bureaucratic administration. A
diffusion geared to the 'pursuit of elusive solutions to cyclical capitalist
crises' through the generation of new manufacturing products, increased
productivity of labour and new techniques for 'stimulating and directing
demand for g o o d s ' . A s in Rule, surveillance is linked to extended
control through expansion and efficiency. But not simply that of the
individual organisation, a wider structural efficiency of the capitalist
system itself:
personal information is necessary for the coordination of
the capitalist system in all its spheres of activity:

126O.H. Gandy, Jr. 'The Political Economy of Communications Competence', in V. Mosco and J.
Wasko (eds) The Political Economy of Information, (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988);
O.H. Gandy, Jr. 'The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureaucratic Social Control',
Journal of Communication, 39 (3), Summer, 1989; O.H. Gandy Jr. 'Information Privacy and the Crisis
of Control', in M. Raboy and P.A. Bruck (eds.). Communication For and Against Democracy (Black
Rose Books, Montreal, 1989).
127Gandy, 'Information privacy..', (1989) op cit, p.60

From the plurality of organisations to the corporate governance of
society
Although Gandy sets up the same social dichotomy as Rule - the
widening gap between individual and organisation - he identifies new
forms of organisational inter-relationships and new forms of corporate
power as the primary source of the massive extension and
transformation of the technical means of surveillance. While Rule talked
of organisations as essentially abstract and equivalent units cooperating
in ways which reinforced their control over particular jurisdictions,
Gandy is more sympathetic to the structural transformations of capitalist
society and their determining effects on the nature of surveillance: the
rise of new techniques of consumer surveillance; the privatisation and
commodification of information; and the complex exchanges of this
commodity between the state and the commercial sector via a growing
sector of 'intermediary' organisations which specialise in personal
information gathering. The result is a deepening 'pool of surveillance
resources' to be drawn upon for the management of the social s y s t e m .
As yet Gandy has only set out a brief scheme of how surveillance
operates at the major structural sites of 'late capitalist' e c o n o m i e s . i ^ o At
the workplace, new employees are screened for employment suitability a process which draws on the combined surveillance of the health and
insurance industry; details of previous employment and sometimes
subjected to psychological assessment. The operation of production is
now increasingly monitored by automatic and unseen surveillance
devices, embedded in production technology, disciplining labour
performance and facilitating productive efficiency.i^i The state
routinely exchanges personal information generated at particular points
129Gandy, The Surveillance Society..', (1989), op cit, pp.61-62. See also Gandy (1988), op cit,
pp. 108-109
130 It should be noted that Gandy accepts the description 'late capitalism' without any explicit
explanation. But it can be inferred from his general framework that he broadly agrees with the basic
components of 'late capitalism, now widely accepted among critical social theorists, that the global
capitalist economy has been beset with a series of structural crises for two decades now centred on
periodic cycles of of overproduction, global recession, followed by periods of intense structural
adjustment geared to the creation of favourable conditions for renewed capital accumulation. This
usually takes the form of; the restructuring of production (labour rationalisation, technological
innovation, development of new product lines and the global re-division of labour), increasing the pace
of exchange through a global information network, and integrating the state into the overall
management of capital. See E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (NLB, London, 1976), chap 1.
l3lGandy, The Surveillance Society...' (1989), op cit, pp.66-67; and Gandy, (1988), op cit, pp.ll3114

of its operation - health, insurance, tax, social security, internal security
etc. - with commercial organisations and intermediary data specialists.
This enhances the control of personal eUgibility for state services and
allows the monitoring of on-going interaction between individual and
state for the administration of its particular codes and regulations.
However, it is the emerging techniques of consumer surveillance which
best represent the new conditions of corporate governance and which
illuminate the ways in which surveillance is being transformed.
Consumer surveillance is based on a massive extension of statistical
surveillance and Gandy points to an altemative conception of the role of
such techniques than that considered by the privacy theorists. One that,
focus [es] on categories of persons and behaviours, rather than
on a particular individual, and is oriented to the prevention of
loss....a process whereby persons (or, increasingly groups) are
compared with empirically or theoretically developed models,
with either key variables, or attributes, or a combination of
attributes...the easiest and most rapidly growing form of
surveillance made possible through telecommunications
links.133
In what might be called the new technologies of consumption, the
practices of profiling identifies consumers as composite statistical
constructs based on sets of variables deemed important to the emerging
consumption industry. Gandy reviews some of the new consumer
profiling techniques conducted via new forms of 'organisational
cooperation', combining vertical integration and horizontal
conglomeration, cutting across the consumption sector (banks,
publishers, media networks and marketing specialists, credit
p r o v i d e r s ) . 134 Examples of the mass profiling techniques of
BehaviourScan, PRIZM, VALS, and VISIONS thoroughly dissolve the
old distinctions between statistical and intelligence data in a process
which utilises new communications technologies to target individual
consumers and mixes their individual receptivity to new products with a
132Gandy, "Information Privacy...', (1989), op cit, pp.61-62; and Gandy, The Surveillance Society...',
(1989), op cit, pp.68-69
133Gandy, 'Information Privacy...', (1989), op cit, p.61
134Gandy, The Surveillance Society...', (1989), op cit, p.73

mass of broader demographic data, derived, for example, from
PRIZM's zip-code determined socio-economic clusters. The emerging
consumer category is enhanced by traditional consumer survey methods
which add a psychographic element (in terms of product-related needs,
desires, motivations) to the process.
As is to be expected given his avowed critical stance, Gandy interprets
the effects of the new surveillance as the extension and intensification of
existing patterns of socio-economic power. Rule's conception of an
homogeneous expansion of 'social control' through the incorporation of
socially neutral individuals into webs of dependency is transformed into
a much sharper analysis of the uneven distributional effects of corporate
social power. Gandy maintains that the informational imiverse of late
capitalism, with its complex exchanges of informational commodities,
its new patterns of cooperation in the ownership and control of
production and content of information along with the sophisticated
techniques of mass profiling present new obstacles to democratic
participation. Existing social inequities are intensified as already
marginalised social groups are denied access to this information
infrastructure.
because of the increasing commoditisation and privatisation of
information, and because of mounting personal and social
deficits, the poor, especially among black and ethnic minority
groups, are largely unable to utilise information resources to
improve the quality of their lives. This aspect of
communications competence, the abihty to understand the
world so as to act to change it, is only one variable in the
equation of inequality^^^
The new surveillance heightens social fragmentation through a series of
divisive methods. The practices of locating, targeting, classifying the
social mass into product-related Hfestyle categories further reduces the
possibility of coherent alternative social practices which challenge the
structures of social power from emerging. In the media constructions of
social reality, increasingly oriented to the marketing of consumer
135Gandy, (1989), op cit, pp.116-120
136im, p.109

commodities, and itself dependent on sophisticated forms of
surveillance, many social groups are simply i n v i s i b l e . in Gandy's
work social control is given a specificity of purpose not apparent in
Rule. Organisations do not simply cooperate and interrelate to extend
jurisdictional coverage, they are linked to the structural dynamics of
capitalism.
,
The Work of Kevin Wilson

Wilson's study of 'home networking', i.e. the provision of interactive
electronic information and entertainment services into subscribing
homes, contextualises and extends Rule's theory of surveillance-based
social control and provides a more concrete, empirical study of
corporate co-operation in the staging of consumer s u r v e i l l a n c e .
The short history of the videotex phenomenon in the US and Westem
Europe confirms some of Gandy's insights into the emerging corporate
structure of consumer surveillance. Videotex and teletext technology
initially offered the potential for the delivery of a wide range of
information services from an array of service providers from both the
public and private sectors. Early optimists talked not only of the
delights of telebanking and teleshopping but new forms of
teledemocracy through viewer participation in issues of public
c o n c e r n . 139 Yet, as Wilson points out it was the advertising, retailing,
and the financial services sectors who were quick to spot the enormous
future potential of the medium and who have since monopolised the
industry. For videotex offered not only the advantage of instantaneous
two-way communication between the corporate sector and the domestic
home but could also capitalise on the most successful mass
communications medium in operation. Moreover, a medium whose
programming structure and message content had been historically
137Gandy maintains that the black American underclass has been further marginalised not only because
it is not represented in the circulation of electronic imagery but also because of its poorly developed
'communications competence' - a result of its poorer to access to new information technologies and its
higher levels functional illiteracy and generally lower educational standards. Gandy, (1989) op cit,
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shaped by the imperatives of the commercial advertising sector.
Videotex soon became an experimental tool of mass consumer
surveillance.
As some of the worlds largest corporations moved into the industry,
interesting forms of vertical and horizontal integration began to appear.
These new joint ventures expanded the corporate partnerships already in
place in other sectors of the consumption industry. Financial institutions
(Chemical Bank, Citibank, Merril Lynch, American Express) joined
with publishers (McGraw-Hill, New York Times, Readers Digest, Time
Inc.), retailers (J.C. Penney, Sears-Roebuck and Grand Union) and
information deliverers (Warner, AT&T, RCA, Nymex) in
experimenting with new techniques of identifying, targeting and
classifying individual consumers with product messages and
instantaneous purchase and credit facilities. All this presented in a
package of consumption-oriented entertainment, i^i
As a new form of surveillance, videotex, according to Wilson, extends
the surveillance capacity of the organisational core and adds a new level
of efficiency to the staging of surveillance itself. Wilson proceeds from
what Rule identifies as the central feature of modem mass surveillance,
the management of social control through the perpetual increase in the
points of interaction between the organisation and its chentele.
home networking will provide the perfect technological
solution to the problem of augmenting points of contact in
systems of public surveillance. Moreover, it will do this on
scale and with an efficiency which clearly could not be
effected otherwise
Just as documentational links between core and client periphery
provided a context of dependency between client and organisation,
videotex promises to 'effectively integrate the individual into an
expanding network of computer-based c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ' . 1 4 3
1 4 0 w i l s o n , op cit, p p . 1 5 - 1 6
1 4 1 , m , pp. 23-25, 32-33
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Just as documentational links between core and client periphery
provided a context of dependency between client and organisation,
videotex promises to 'effectively integrate the individual into an
expanding network of computer-based c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ' .
According to Wilson, videotex provides a number of novel solutions to
the on-going dialectic between the imperative of extending surveillance
capacity and the resulting economic constraints. Videotex increases the
frequency and quality of contacts between the core and clientele as a
result of its reach into the domestic home. Client interaction through the
watching of programmes, the response to surveys, quizzes, and product
marketing tests and the purchase of products can proceed with
increasing ease in the comfort and security of the home. There is a new
measure of efficiency in the automation of service provision and the
rapidity of client response, collapsing traditional barriers of time and
distance between centre and periphery, Wilson foresees a further
enhancement in the effective management of the clientele as the data
generated through interaction increases in quantity and quality. This is
facilitated through a mix of data surveillance techniques. An initial
exhaustive client survey is administered in order to identify and locate
clients and for the compilation of critical consumption-related data such
as financial status, occupation, home ownership, type of car, spouse,
and children, and psychographic data for the analysis of consumption
habits and drives. Once the subscriber is set in place high quality data
relating to his real-time participation in the service can be continuously
generated. The resulting 'informational commodity' can be utilised for
further marketing of new products, including the construction of real
time testing conditions, never before available to marketers. This
commodity is also circulated among the corporate participants for their
own organisationally-specific p u r p o s e s .
While Gandy and Wilson show how surveillance is deeply incorporated
in the technologies of capitalist social control, and thus overcome the
problems in Rule's work, several critical studies have explored what is
really the key feature of social control, that of the enforcement of
143/i,/^/., p.97
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individual discipline to the changing structural requirements of capital
itself.
(iii) Bringing in Capitalism 2: Surveillance as Capitalist
Discipline
Foucault was the first to explore the role of surveillance in the
application of social discipline and his elaboration of discourse and
power has had a considerable influence on contemporary radical studies
of surveillance as a mode of capitalist discipline. It is worth studying his
social theory in some detail in order to draw out the potential it offers
for contemporary surveillance, how it is being applied in recent studies,
and as a prelude to further possibilities.
Foucault: Surveillance and Power
For Foucault the specific techniques of surveillance are a central
component in the strategic utilisation of discourse in precise institutional
settings. Discourse has a 'double functionality', it is a form of
knowledge and an application of power. He has studied the generic
anatomy of discourse as the construction of particular objects of
knowledge, the ordering of the object domain, the constitution of human
subjects as discursive objects, and the modes of discipline and
distribution of docile, utilisable, bodies.
For Foucault, social discipline is embedded in the very mode of seeing
which underlies scientific, bureaucratic, therapeutic, juridical
discourses. The gaze which orders the world as defined grids of objectrelations. In his early work The Order of Things he locates the
appearance of eighteenth century discourses which signal a withdrawal
from the world into representation. The new analysis of wealth, natural
history , and general grammar constitute a field of mobile sign relations
attracting meaning only from their position in the field. Wealth no
longer 'inscribed' in the bearer but 'coinable', exchangeable, constantly
circulating, attracting value in terms of this exchange;i46 a natural
history based on the 'visual' interrogation of plants and animals,
classifying 'series' of identity and difference in complex taxonomic
146m. Foucault, The Order of Things (Tavistock Publications, London, 1986), pp. 174-175.

dispelling it of humours, essences. The new instruments of surgery
dissect it while the practices of social hygiene segregate it from the
collective social body
In his later work Discipline and Punish Foucault explores the
domination of the 'gaze' in terms of institutionalised discipline - the set
of discursive techniques arising in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries aimed at producing docile yet useful bodies.i'^s
The 'social' body is segregated into a series of institutional collectivities
- the hospital, the prison, the barracks, the asylum and the school - and
is subjected to precise technologies of discipline which order its
functions through time and space. Foucault describes two disciplinary
mechanisms which classify and order the social body into a utilisable
force.
Firstly, there are the technologies of individualisation in which the
social body is divided, segmented, and enclosed, in order to 'transform
the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered
m u l t i p l i c i t i e s ' . T h i s is a process of specialisation which cuts across
functional-behavioural, spatial and chronological dimensions. The
imposition of a hierarchical system of rank fixes temporary location and
'circulates' and 'distributes' individuals in a 'network of relations' .
Bodies are ranked by space - rows of desks, beds, cells, corridors,
courtyards, compartments. Enclosures for the classification and
separation of individuals through the creation of difference in the
apphcation institutional norms and regulations. Progress, character and
cleanliness differentiate school children while patients are segregated by
degree, symptom and condition.i^o The classification table is the
defining technological artefact of this disciplinary moment. Discipline
by behavioural function bisects time in the precise structuration of
behavioural and chronological segments. Foucault quotes a nineteenth
century educationalist:
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8.45 entrance of the monitor, 8.52 the monitor's summons,
8.56 the entrance of the children and prayer, 9.00 the children
go to their benches, 9.04 the first slate...^^^
This process of accumulating 'duration', attempts the extraction of an
inexaustive usage of time by intensive segmentation, increasing the
usefulness of the body as an applied force. The nineteenth century
factory is the classic 'functional site' which combines the functional,
spatial and chronological dimensions of the mechanisms of
individualisation. 152
Secondly, there are the disciplinary mechanisms of totalisation in the rearticulation of the assembly of functional and spatial segments into a
'new combination of forces' directed to particular institutional ends.
The social body as a carefully constructed machine.
the unit - regiment, battalion, section and, later, division became a sort of machine with many parts, moving in relation
to one another, in order to arrive at a configuration and to
obtain a specific result.
in short, the need to invent a machinery whose principle
would no longer be the mobile or immobile mass, but a
geometry of divisible segments.i53
The techniques of individualisation and totahsation should not be read as
isolated, discrete or contradictory processes. They are two moments of
the shifting and strategic 'combinations' of bodies as forces. This
'coercion' of bodies can be seen as the placement of time-space grid on
the collective social body. Discipline is enforced by the establishment of
points of surveillance inserted between hierarchical and functional levels
as well as at the distributed points of spatial enclosure. Thus,
surveillance is dispersed and routinised, operating at multiple locations.
A process in which all positions, divisions and behaviours are seen by an
impersonal gaze no longer emanating from a central point of control.
The famous metaphor of the panopticon represents the perfect form of
p.150
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surveillance is dispersed and routinised, operating at multiple locations.
A process in which all positions, divisions and behaviours are seen by an
impersonal gaze no longer emanating from a central point of control.
The famous metaphor of the panopticon represents the perfect form of
surveillance in which an unseen gaze produces an 'anticipatory
c o n f o r m i t y ' . 154 However, it is mistaken to assume that this is the only
example of surveillance Foucault used. Points of observation are less
impressive and often mundane - raised observatories in drill grounds,
the strategic placement of superiors and supervisors between dormitory
beds, at ends of corridors, in between workstations. Performance was
timed, examined, assessed, judged by finely graded codes, regulations,
statutes, rules - elaborate 'micro-penalties' enforcing obedience with the
threat of p u n i s h m e n t . ^55 Modes of surveillance are essential to the
stabilisation of the disciplinary complex, through the applied 'penalty of
t h e n o r m ' . 156

The disciplinary complex, punctuated by surveillance means that bodies
are elements in an imposed system of relations and accrue identity by
their behavioural and spatial location on the time-space grid. Meaning,
identity, utility are constructed through position, function and
performance. Distributed and hierarchical surveillance is the major
source of the stream of documentation which accumulates through the
perpetual observation, assessment, profiling, confinement and
punishment of individuals passing through the disciplinary network.
Identity and personal history are 'objectified' in documentation.
Individuals become 'cases' and 'case h i s t o r i e s ' .
For Foucault, the subject of surveillance is never pre-formed, as in
liberal theory with its carefully demarcated reahn of privacy and its
formal rights, obHgations and protections, but is constituted as a special
discursive object by the complexes of surveillance-based disciplinary
techniques themselves. Individuals emerge as 'subjects' in the very
practices of surveillance.
154For a description of Bentham's proposed panopticon see, ibid., pp.200-208.
^^^ibid., pp.172-173
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Webster and Robins: The 'electronic gaze' and 'cybernetic capitalism
The work of Webster and Robins^^s throughout the 1980s shares the
same point of departure as that of Gandy and Wilson but differs in its
utilisation of Foucault. Nevertheless, they follow a similar pattern of
investigation as that of Gandy and Wilson, beginning with the defining
feature of contemporary surveillance practices - their integration in the
overall dynamic of capital accumulation, permitting a tightening of
control by way of the intensive monitoring of the production and
circulation of commodities, especially new forms of information
commodities. Webster and Robins also examine the ways in which
surveillance is deeply implicated in the stimulation of consumption, as it
improves the visibility of consumption pattems, and operates as an
important mode of identifying and selling ever new and diversified
products. In this way it is linked to the continual commodification of the
spaces and functions of social life.
However, unlike Gandy and Wilson, Webster and Robins' explanations
of the changing strategies of accumulation are not limited to the surface
economics of corporate power, the methods and technologies utilised in
the drive to rationalise production and exchange and expand market
reach. Their aim is to expose the changing forms of capitalist discipline
which reduce citizens to functional elements of capital and permit its
perpetual extension and control. They do this by blending two discrete
theories of the mechanics of modem social discipline. By way of
Foucault's elaboration of institutionalised panoptical discipline, and by
theories of social discipline specific to capitahst conditions, Taylorism
and Fordism.
We have seen that in Foucault's studies of panoptical discipline
institutional practices are not linked to, or a result of, any specific
socio-economic determination. In other words panoptical discipline is
not necessarily a form of capitalist discipline, its operations are not
shaped by the law of value. Foucault was mainly concerned with what
he termed the 'microphysics of power' in the cellular imposition of
158f. Webster and K. Robins, Information Technology: A Luddite Analysis (Ablex, Norwood, NJ,
1986); K. Robins and F. Webster, 'Cybernetic Capitalism: Information, Technology, Everyday Life',
in V. Mosco and J. Wasko (eds.), op cit; and K. Robins and F. Webster, 'Athens Without Slaves...Or
Slaves Without Athens? - The Neurosis of Technology', Science as Culture, No.3, 1988

production of a docile, manipulable body, isolated, compartmentalised,
classified and trained for the daily reproduction of detailed behavioural
tasks. The imposed temporal-spatial grid was itself punctuated at every
cornice by permanent, yet unseen surveillance. Webster and Robins
utilise Foucault in two ways which combine to extend his analysis to the
processes of contemporary accumulation patterns. Firstly, they replace
the institutional gaze with the 'electronic eye' of modem information
technologies operative at increasingly dispersed points across the social
landscape of late capitalism. Second, they study how panoptical
discipline is effected in a global socio-economic structure free of the
multitude of visible boundaries and enclosures which characterised
Foucault's nineteenth century institutions.
we want to suggest that the new communication and information
technologies - particularly in the form of the electronic grid
towards which they are moving - permit a massive extension of
that same principle of mobilisation to which Bentham [the
author of the panopticon] aspired. What these technologies
support, in fact, is the same dissemination of power and control,
but freed from the architectural and geographic constraints of
Bentham's stone and brick prototype. On the basis of the
information revolution, not just the prison or the factory, but
the social totality, comes to be part of the hierarchical and
disciplinary panoptic machine^^^
The new electronic gaze is distributed across the social whole
monitoring the labour process, tracking circulation, illuminating
consumption patterns, and penetrating domestic space. Yet unlike
Foucault's panoptical gaze which is infused in a disciplinary structuring
which excludes no one, a hierarchical distribution of power in which the
watchers are also watched from another level, the dispersed
technologies of the electronic eye are owned and operated by an
increasing concentration of transnationalised companies and highly
centralised modem states.i^o According to Webster and Robins, the
most important feature of corporate-dominated electronic panopticism
is the way that it allows the decentralisation of observation and control,
I59webster and Robins (1986), op du p.346
l^ÛRobins and Webster, 'Cybernetic Capitalism' op cit, pp.47-48

expressed at 'multiple and differential' nodes on the grid, while at the
same time allowing an increasing centralisation of corporate power. The
'electronic grid is a transparent structure in which activities taking place
at the "periphery" - remote working, electronic banking, the
consumption of information or entertainment, teleshopping, and
communication - are always visible to the electronic eye'.i^i The flow of
information along corporately operated networks fuses observation and
power in a single disciplinary process. Individuals as workers,
consumers, citizens find their movements tracked and their transactions
audited thereby aligning individual behaviour ever more closely to
corporate codes of practice. The electronic eyes of the corporate centres
illuminate the multitude of interactions between people and capital
across space and through time. Such exhaustive examination also
provides the basis for improvements and adjustments to the interface
with capital, extending and rationalising its control. xhe disciplinary
aspect of the electronic grid is most effectively enforced in the sphere of
consumption:
people themselves will be increasingly relegated to the status of
data; their actions and transactions will be recorded as digits and
ciphers by the ubiquitous and always watching information
machines. Already credit agencies, finance houses and large
retailers are constructing databases on customers and potential
customers, categorising them, analysing them, scrutinising their
movements, that they might be used to the optimum benefit of
the corporation. 163
Like Wilson and Gandy, Webster and Robins point to the ability of
corporations to harvest growing volumes of consumer transaction and
performance data which are then channelled into the advertising and
marketing sectors for the construction and targeting of consumer
imagery and product messages. According to Webster and Robins this is
creating a 'cybernetic' relationship between the production and
consumption of consumer commodities. Surveillance data is ordered to
produce highly differentiated consumer categories of particular needs
161,m, pp.60-61
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and desires which, in turn, mirror the use value of (increasingly
useless) products.i64
An important feature of 'cybernetic capitalism' is the gradual
consumerisation of domestic and community space. Webster and Robins
claim that the extension of the logic of consumption into traditional
community patterns of behaviour further shifts the balance of social
power toward capital. The abundance of community skills and the rich
pool of cultural knowledge which once facilitated education,
entertainment and communication, all necessary for the maintenance of
community cohesion and identity, are being replaced not only by
distant, bureaucratised state services but by what Illich has termed, the
'professionally engineered information commodity'^^^. A form of
'social taylorism expanding beyond its origins in production to a wider
cultural deskilling. Just as the skilled worker has been increasingly
dispossessed of his power through job simplification, fragmentation and
mechanisation, the citizen is stripped to the singularity of a largely
passive consumer. The one dimensional lifeworld of passive
consumption follows closely the social dynamics of production on the
shopfloor - isolation, fragmentation, and alienation. An important aspect
of this is the partial relegation of the consumer, and maybe in the
future, the worker, into the privatised, domestic space of the home.
This drift toward a privatised individual existence, more conducive to
the needs of capital cannot be compared to the universalised private
sphere of the liberal surveillance theorists. It is a space punctuated and
penetrated by the information technologies of consumption and as we
shall see the prime target for the practices of consumer surveillance.
Mark Poster's 'superpanopticism'
Poster points to several difficulties in the application of Foucault's
nineteenth century studies in modem conditions. He claims that the
disappearance of the spatial and temporal coordinates which
^^ibid., p.67
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distinguishes electronic panopticism from the Benthamite prototype pose
new problems for the maintenance of discipline in late capitalist
f o r m a t i o n s . 167 i n Foucault's studies a central aspect of the disciplining
process was the construction of specific identities shaped by the
disciplinary technologies which classified, partitioned and trained
individuals. As we have seen in Webster and Robins, electronic
panopticism is devoid of the spatial and temporal coordinates which are
essential for the constitution of the prisoner, the insane, the hospital
patient. While they maintained that the new observers behind the
technologies of electronic surveillance were the powerful agents of
transnational capital. Poster returns to Foucault's belief that there is no
privileged point of observation, all are positioned through the
mechanics of its operation. The disappearance of both the structural
coordinates of panopticism and the privileged observer means discipline
must be somehow enforced by the streams of electronic traces delivered
through the operations of surveillance itself. Poster asks how is
discipline assured when it is limited to only the manipulation of signs?
In answering this Poster takes up the theme of the radical theorists of
surveillance, by examining how the continual stream of data is used to
constitute new subjectivities. Gandy, Wilson, and Webster and Robins
have indicated that detailed construction of consumer categories is
becoming essential for the disciplining of consumption around new and
diversified product lines. Yet there has thus far been little explanation
of the actual mechanics of this discipline in the consumer, or other,
contexts. Poster maintains that discipline is affected by the participation
of the population in its 'own self-constitution as subjects of the
normalising gaze of the superpanopticon'. There are three aspects to
this. Firstly, the gradual drift to digitalisation of data not only enables
ease of storage and rapidity of manipulation and dissemination it also
provides a completely unambiguous language of representation. 168
Previous forms of representation, such as writing, were materially
framed and displayed traces of its origins, they were still forms of
communication that presupposed a reader who was subjected to various
forms of influence and authority evident in the materiality of the
message. For example, books come with an identified author and a
167m. Poster, The Mode of Information (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990), p.86
p.94

publisher which signifies a type of authority, and a cultural context. The
old crafts of bookmaking and publishing left traces of workmanship
indicative of productive practices of the time and occasional errors and
misprintings reminded the reader that texts were the product of a
'community of w o r k e r s ' . i 6 9 i n contrast databases construct fields of
relations between variables free on any mediating context, but based on
a new limiting grid:
a database arranges information in rigidly defined categories or
fields. When viewed on a computer monitor or printed out on
paper each field is a column and each record is a row. Each
field contains a limited number of spaces and if the field is for
dates or numbers, entries into it are even more limited in their
form. Speed and efficiency of the database varies directly with
the fixity of the form in which the information appears in it. A
database might consist of the following fields: an individuals
first and last name, social security number, street address, city,
state, zip code, phone number, age, sex, race, unpaid parking
violations, x-rated video cassettes rented, subscriptions to
communist periodicals.The agency that collects the information
constitutes individuals according to these p a r a m e t e r s . i ^ o
Each field is complete and discrete and the absence of any contextual
trace which might complicate the clarity of the field or introduce doubt
into the relations it enters with others is excluded by design. The
permutations are endless, and can be created and transmitted
instantaneously.
Secondly, the individual participates in his own surveillance every time
he passes through a transaction point. He is implicated in his own
d i s c i p l i n e . i ^ i Thirdly, this self-initiated and maintained accumulation of
data leads to a 'multiplication of the individual'. The individual finds
himself confronted at many points by an 'additional self, closely
approximating some statistical norm developed by the particular needs
of agencies across the social landscape. Moreover, this statistical self
'may be acted upon to the detriment of the "real" self without that "real"
169/^,/^., p.95
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self ever being aware of what is h a p p e n i n g * . xhe overall effect is the
production of a stabilising normality evolving in line with an
increasingly multifaceted administration of social life.
Electronic Panopticism: Problems and Possibilities
The utilisation of Foucault's discursive method produces a number of
insights into the role and nature of surveillance in the saturated
informational conditions of late capitalism. However, despite the
modifications which Webster and Robins, and Poster have made in
order to understand the disciplinary processes of contemporary
surveillance there are still some methodological features of Foucault's
work which do not translate easily into specifically capitalist
applications of surveillance, and which obscure the actual mechanisms
of disciplinary surveillance in these social systems.
Recall that for Foucault observation and discipline are fused into the
application of discourse. There is no 'outside' of the disciplinary
apparatus, no extemal 'big brother' standing free of its mechanisms and
commanding its operations. In Foucault's terms, there is no privileged
'subject' which is not itself constituted as a discursive object at some
point, whether it be an impersonal 'big brother', a government, a
bureaucracy, a massive international corporation, or even, a dominant
class or mode of production. This means that the incorporation of
Foucault into a radical political economy of capitalist discipline which
posits, explicitly or implicitly, a single determinate process - the
production and circulation of commodities - and a totalising conception
of the social system, derived from this privileged moment, poses
problems. We have seen that Webster and Robins modified Foucault by
designating two extemal subjects, transnational capital and the
burgeoning apparatus of the state, as the primary operator and
beneficiary of electronic panopticism, utilising information technology
in ways which decentralise the mechanics of social control while
simultaneously centralising corporate power.
In contrast. Poster suggests that informational capitalism enforces
individual discipline through the manipulation of the mass of
p.98

In contrast, Poster suggests that informational capitalism enforces
individual discipline through the manipulation of the mass of
transactional traces generated through the interface between individuals
and various data gathering agents. Individuals are confronted with
complex data profiles nominally representing themselves but internally
structured in ways which primarily represent the interests of particular
agencies. The resulting multiplication of the individual into an array of
data subjects, partly generated by the individual herself, is then used as a
disciplinary weapon. Unfortunately, Poster makes no attempt to show
how this discipline is effected. There may be good reasons for this. In
Foucault the disciplinary constitution of individuals as data subjects
(institutional 'cases') was only part of the larger physical architecture of
discipline which in the prison, for example, used partitioning walls,
cells, watchtowers, training yards etc. to produce the results the
institution required. Poster rightly maintains that the physical
architecture of Nineteenth century discipline has been superseded by the
essentially invisible processes of electronic panopticism. However, in
doing this, he overlooks the vast technological infrastructure which
facilitates contemporary panopticism and which is fused into its
operations. Similarly, Webster and Robins do not explicitly spell out
how discipline is maintained in contemporary informationalised
societies. Yet the complex forms of discipline in these societies can be
better appreciated if the mechanics of surveillance are more visible.
Part three below is an exploration of how modern panoptical
surveillance is staged in the sector of mass consumption, concentrating
especially on new forms of electronically mediated consumption.

PART THREE: THE MECHANICS OF ELECTRONIC
DISCIPLINE
(i) The Mobilisation and Discipline of Consumption: the
Example of Electronic Funds Transfer
There are three broad features of the staging of surveillance in
consumption. Firstly, there is the continuing proliferation of
information and communication technologies linked to the
administration of consumption, its expansion and intensification.
Secondly, these technologies are providing the beginnings of an
integrated circuit of consumption wiring up banks, credit card
operators, finance companies, retail outlets, travel agents, hotels, hire
cars, restaurants, airports, and of course, the consumer. And, thirdly,
this inter-connectivity is increasingly facilitated by a digitally-operated
international business network which transmits and manipulates
information gathered at the mass of transaction points across the
landscape of consumption, connecting the agents of commercial and
financial capital in new pattems of combination.
Embedded in this architecture of consumption is a complex form of
surveillance-based consumer discipline which attempts to:
(i) mobilise individuals into following definite spatial pattems of
consumption determined by leading corporate agents in the
consumption sector.
(ii) ensure consumer performance at points of consumption
follows prescribed rules through the application of a series of
'micro-penalties'.
(iii) inculcate into citizens a personal ideology of consumption by
identifying and targeting them as consumer prospects via the
process of consumer categorisation.

Electronically-mediated consumption: electronic funds transfer.
The development of EFT over the last decade is providing a number of
economic benefits for banking capital. A recent study has shown that
nearly 90% of the six types of payment between institution and
customer - cash purchase, deposit of cash to an account, withdrawal of
cash from an account, transfer of cash by a payment order, debit
transfer from one account to another, credit transfer from one account
to another - have become automated. This has led to reductions in the
labour component of transactional processing through the partial
elimination of paper artefacts and costly paper transfers between
institutions. In addition the EFTPOS sub-system is producing definite
benefits for retailers through the electronic integration of the central
features of the retailing process - instantaneous updating of sales
recorded and volume and type of stock moved. EFTPOS also provides
joint benefits to banks and retailers through the collapsing of the spatial
and temporal distance between banking and consumption, and the
instantaneous transfer of funds between networked banks and
retailers. 174
The electronic interface between consumers, banks and retailers has led
to privacy concerns that data which illuminates patterns of consumer
movement between transaction points might be distributed to outside
state agencies such as the police and welfare. There are also fears that
individually identified transaction data might be used for purposes other
than that consented to by the consumer such as direct marketing
operations. There is already evidence that data pooled by banks and
retailers is being used for marketing purposes.i^s The concentration on
privacy once again obscures other disciplinary elements embedded in
EFTS. Two broad categories of consumer discipline are secured
through EFTS. Firstly, there is an overall tension between the
incitement to consume and the instantaneous, automated application of
penalties for consumer transgression of the stipulated mles of consumer
performance decided by the banks and enforced by retailers. Secondly,
as has already been noted, EFT/EFTPOS is creating a circuit of
electronically-mediated consumption which is tying consumer purchase
173OECD op cit, p.24
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to funds through automatic teller machines (ATMs) has complemented
the extension of retail trading hours. A combination which frees
consumption time from traditional business hours, including as it does,
working hours. Increasingly banks, building societies, and credit unions
are cooperating to allow customers access to each others ATM faciUties.
EFTPOS removes further obstacles to consumption, improving even on
the 24 hour availability of ATMs, by combining banking and shopping
at the site of consumption itself. A recent trend has been toward the
integration of hitherto separate elements of modem consumption cheques, credit cards, ATM cards, in-house loan cards - into single
multi-purpose cards which maximises the ease of shopping.176 For
example the American Express Gold Card can be used not only to access
cash on a 24 hour basis at thousands of sites across the globe as well as
access to EFTPOS facilities but is also connected to a flow of credit
from the American Express Bank. More recently, homebanking
provisions are beginning to extend the network directly into the home.
Of course, the incitement to consume is tempered by the limits on the
availability of personal funds and the ability of consumers to satisfy
credit repayment schedules. The strategy of banks, is to do their part in
driving consumption levels constantly up to a level where clients are
permanently caught in interest paying credit traps, but never to the
point where they are unable to repay. Once customers fall foul of these
rules of the game a battery of penalties are activated. Individuals
attempting to push consumption beyond personal limits are
automatically penahsed at cash dispensers and at the point of sale. Cards
fraudulently used are swallowed up. Those unable to meet credit
repayments find that their floor limits are reduced and eventually
further credit is denied and EFTPOS access is withdrawn. The exclusion
of those flouting credit rules is maintained by the circulation of socalled 'blacklists' generated by, and circulated amongst, credit reference
agencies and credit providers as well as major retailers. These lists are
records of current bankrupts, multiple bankrupts, known aliases, recent
credit cancellations, lost, missing, unretumed and fraudulently obtained
cards.
176asTEC op cit, p.91
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This disciplined mobilisation of consumption can only operate via a vast
global telecommunications network providing rapid exchanges of
transaction data. For the system to work at its optimum, data must flow
on a real time basis between the data hubs of different banking
companies, from bank headquarters to the branch periphery, from
individual banks to the dispersed points of consumer interface, and
between the thousands of nodes of the banking system as a whole and the
participating retail data system. In reality it is only partially automated
and does not operate on a fully real time basis. However, the
architecture of an integrated system is being put in place. A global
network of data flows between bank headquarters via the SWIFT
network, which utilises the INTELNET satellite s y s t e m . 1 7 8 EFTS
transactional data flows from the point of customer interface to national
automated clearing houses which allows customer access to ATMs
located at banks other than that with which they hold an account. In
Australia retailers and banks participating in EFTPOS are connected via
centralised switching centres operated by the national PTT, T e l e c o m .
In addition, retailers and banks transmit customer financial information
between their own corporate centres and dispersed branch peripheries
using the International Business Service sateUite system which provides
direct satellite access. The introduction of miniaturised satellite
transmission and receiving systems, VSATs, now allows retailing
companies operating in-house credit facilities to provide instantaneous,
central validation of credit transactions generated at scattered branches.
In the US, K-Mart links its 2100 stores in this way.i^o
The application of instantaneous, automated micropenalties, facilitated
by the transference of data from point to centre and back again, is
complemented by emerging forms of corporate integration and service
diversification which are culminating in the control of systems of
electronically-mediated consumption which discipline consumer
I^SR.T. Clark, "Electronic Funds Transfer: The Creeping Revolution', Telecommunications Policy,
Vol.8, No.l, p!40
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performance to specific patterns determined by the corporate operators.
In the last decade new forms of international service alliances between
retailers, bankers, hoteliers, airlines, tourist services and fast food
chains have developed. For example. Sears Roebuck, the worlds largest
retailer has diversified into videotex (the Home Shopping Channel) as
well as insurance and financial services in order to more closely align
the provision of credit with the consumption of its products.^^i Through
its ownership of Allstate Mortgage and Insurance Co., as well as
Coldwell Barker, the largest real estate broker in the US, Sears is able
to internalise consumption of a number of products - financial,
retailing, insurance and home purchase - by merging, matching and
extending customer data in ways which enhance the operations of each
discrete a r e a . American Express combine travel facilities (American
Express card, travellers cheques and travel services) with private
banking services and the QUBE interactive cable c o m p a n y , a l l o w i n g
both the extension of electronic credit along international tourist circuits
and a ever closer control over the steps of consumption - the facilitation
of credit, the targeted advertising of products into the domestic home
and the provision of instantaneous purchase facilities via electronic
payment transfer. Close alliances have formed between hotels and
airlines and general travel services. This means that combinations such
as American Express, United Airlines and Hilton hotels can offer
complex packages which lay out intemational circuits of consumption,
which not only stimulates consumption in ways mutually advantageous
to the corporate participants, but at each point on the circuit
performance discipHne can be enforced. In addition data generated at
various points on the circuit can be channelled back into the future
marketing of products. The United Nations Centre for Transnational
Corporations (UNCTC) maintains that linkages are extending between
airlines, tour operators, and car rental agencies, many of which are
owned by airiines themselves. In addition, most service corporations are
also diversifying internally, combining market research, advertising
(often in conjunction with intemational advertising houses such as
181K.M. Davidson, Megamergers (Ballinger. Cambridge, Mass. 1985), pp.274-275; for a broader
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Saatchi& Saatchi), and direct marketing of service p r o d u c t s , Further
expansions are no doubt possible and feasible which will permit more
complex flows of transactional data between points, intensifying the
stimulation, integration and discipline of consumption even further.
Yet not everyone can be included in this integrated network and another
strategy of consumer surveillance is the discipline of exclusion. It is
now well documented that some socio-economic sectors are being
excluded from the growing networks of electronically-mediated
consumption. A recent Australian study showed that 17% of the adult
population remained 'unbanked', holding no account of any type with a
bank and are therefore do not participate in the ATM, EFTPOS, or
credit card circuit. 69% of the unbanked population fall into the lowest
socio-economic quintiles, earning less than $A15,000 per annum.i85
This sector of the population are unable to pass through the consumer
credit clearing houses and on to the circuit of electronic credit.
Alongside the poorest who are excluded altogether, it is clear that
participation in the circuit is very uneven and it may be argued that
much of the international circuit of travel, credit, luxury
accommodation and retail consumption is available to only a small
number of affluent and mobile citizens. Though there are signs that
corporations selling 'downmarket' products - petrol, groceries, hquor are now utilising EFTPOS s y s t e m s . H o w e v e r , even the partial
participation of individuals in the system may collectively be
transforming the social and spatial structure of consumption in ways
which reinforce the power of the transnational service sector. For
example, the growing popularity of ATMs is already reducing
accessibility to local 'bricks and mortar' branches.187 in addition, the
ease of shopping and consumption provided by EFTs and EFTPOS and
the sheer economies of scale produced by corporate operation of the
system may further enhance the shift toward large retail dominance of
consumption. Small shopkeepers are doubly disadvantaged. Their own
185s. Singh, 'Changing Relationships Between Consumers and Financial Institutions', in New
Directions in Consumer Financial Services, a National Consumer Affairs Advisory Council Forum,
Canberra. 1990. p.80
I86in Australia, for example, supermarkets, hardwares, and petrol stations were, by 1987, some of the
fastest growing areas of EFTPOS. See, OECD, op cit, p.33
l^^ibid., p.88

exclusion from the EFTS circuit and the disappearance of bank branches
from local shopping centres will further reduce the popularity of local
shopping. The acceptance of EFTPOS will intensify this trend as
customer participation means greater ease of shopping, cheaper
products through massive economies of scale, and customer access to
further financial and retail incentives provided by corporate participants
in the circuit. The new corporate combinations and forms of
diversification which are driving consumption are producing a highly
informated environment and allowing the permanent fine tuning of its
operations. The provision of individual credit and loan facilities can be
maximised through bank access to shopping transaction data providing
details of retail consumption patterns of the same individual. On a
broader scale, analysis of customer sales data provides details of product
volume and type and may be matched with bank details of the
demographic profile of EFTPOS customers resulting in a better
targeting of product with consumer.
These trends will accelerate the movement toward a clearly
differentiated bisection of consumption between corporate dominated
spaces of consumption (hypermarkets, shopping malls, and eventually
teleshopping) replete with on-line credit and cash a c c e s s , a n d local
shopping centres catering for the less mobile, less affluent sectors,
excluded from the circuit. Traditionally community-based shopping
centres have been the sites for a number of public activities centred on
commimity needs and interests. People frequent local shopping centres
not just for the purpose of shopping but to meet friends, visit libraries,
attend social clubs and public meetings. The general decline in
significance and popularity of local shopping centres over the last few
decades, and the removal and down grading of these important social
functions located within this space has been a result of the increasing
corporatisation of consumption and the massive economies of scale this
provides. The shopping mall and hypermarket present a much more
purified space for consumption. Older community interaction is
dissolved as consumers drive in from dispersed suburban locations and
188it is also now argued that corporate-dominated consumption is itself bisected between suburban
mall shopping and 'specialised, non-routine' luxury and leisure consumption gathered around the
metropoUtan service hubs in the central business districts of large cities such as New York and London.
Sites of executive shopping near to the headquarters of the major service corporations. See, N. Buck,
M. Drennan and K. Newton, 'Dynamics of the Metropolitan Economy', in S.S. Fainstem, I. Gordon
and M. Harloe, {ods.). Divided Cities (Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1992), pp.101-102.

are confronted at every point with the images and narratives of an
increasingly universalised culture of consumption linked, obviously, to
ever new ranges of corporate products J
Mike Davis' recent startling work on contemporary Los Angeles
provides the most advanced example of the reconstitution of public
space into a corporately operated space of consumption. In sections of
Los Angeles a heterogeneous mix of surveillance technologies have been
combined to purify sections of urban space for middle class
consumption, acting as a screening process to exclude social groups
designated unfit for participation. Combinations of
electronic
surveillance (close-circuit video surveillance, infra red beams), physical
surveillance
(private security guard foot patrols, public police
surveillance) as well as strategically located consumption technologies
(ATMs, EFT-POS,) with well regulated access and usage are reinforced
by new forms of 'architectural policing', incorporating a further 'bias
against accessibility' - security controlled private parking stations linked
by elevated, glassed-in pedways and private appropriation of existing
public access points. The whole surveillance 'package' is designed to
provide 'a seamless continuum of middle class work, consumption and
recreation', i^o
The physical exclusion of those considered unfit to participate in the
circuits of electronically-meditated consumption is mirrored at another
level. The informated global environment of EFT is enhancing the
power and reach of the marketing sector of consumption. We have seen
how new information technologies are already providing new data
resources for the important process of consumer segmentation and
classification. There is evidence that consumer performance data
189 For a study of the US experience in the re-ordering of the 'spatial division of consumption' see, D.
Harvey, The Urbanisation of Capital (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp.208-212.
190m Davis City of Quartz (Verso, London, 1990), Chap.4. Ironically, Davis' studies of the security
trends of middle class suburbia turn the traditional argument of surveillance, as the invasion of privacy,
on its head The emergence of 'suburban enclavisation' or the 'gated suburb' is based on a combination
of surveillance technologies in order to protect the privacy of the wealthy (defined in its crudest
property form) from the destructive intrusion of the poor, the marginalised, the lawless. Systems of
exclusion which encompass security walls, the barricading of streets, 'resident-financed guard stations',
close-circuit video surveiUance, electronic alarm systems, personal escorts, watch patrols, supplemented
by the 'macro-security' of police law enforcement utilising aerial surveillance, electronic taggmg
devices attached to property and wired to police stations, and an on-line database of cnmmals and
criminal suspects.

derived from the integration of retailing and banking is flowing into inhouse marketing programmes, and through the clearing houses of credit
bureaus into the databases of speciahst marketing corporations-^^! Both
the in-house marketing arms of retailers, insurance and financial
companies, and banks, as well as these marketing specialists, are
increasingly utilising consumer segmentation software programmes such
as the US-based Potential Rating Index for ZIP Markets (PRIZM) and
Values and Lifestyles (VALS). These programmes cross-tabulate
geodemographic and psychographic categories to produce a number of
distinct 'lifestyle' groupings which are then assigned a consumption
rating. For example, PRIZM involves a series of cross-tabulations in
which the 36,000 zip codes in the US are overlain with consumer
survey and census data to construct five basic lifestyle groupings - social
rank, ethnicity, mobility, family life cycle, and housing style. The result
is a set of 40 clusters of consumer identity ranked into categories of
affluence based on age, sex, occupation, family structure, ethnic
background, geographical location, propensity to consume, and product
l o y a l t i e s . 1 9 2 VALS, which is used to overlay PRIZM, cross-tabulates
even further by integrating basic psychological categories - need-driven,
inner-directed, outer-directed, integrated, achievers, emulators,
societaUy conscious, belongers, sustainers, and survivors - in order to
provide a psychological dimension to the segmentation process. The
outcome is a system of classifications which illuminates the dull mass of
anonymous consumers into 30 or 40 social narratives designed
specifically to fit evolving consumption p a t t e r n s . EFTS related data
on individual consumption patterns helps to differentiate consumer
segments even further.
Obviously, only the higher segments (the PRIZM categories of 'blue
blood estates', 'money and brains', and 'young influentials') interest
marketers, retailers and advertisers. Those social groups represented in
the lowest categories consist of the urban poor living in the materially
and socially decimated inner cities subsisting on welfare payments
('urban renewal') and disadvantaged rural communities ('back country
191commission for the Future, op cit, p.5; see also, 'Developments in Credit Reporting', The Privacy
Bulletin. Von, No.l, April 1991, p.6
192m.J. Weiss, The Clustering of America (Harper and Row, New York, 1988), p.ix
^^'^ibid., pp.10-12; and David Shepard Associates Inc, The New Direct Marketing (Homewood,
Illinois, 1990), p24

folks' and 'hard scrabble'), The inequalities faced by these groups are
extended in two ways. Firstly, as the trend toward admission to the
electronic credit circuit is decided upon statistically-based indicators of
occupation, age, and stability of residence etc., people from the lower
categories are excluded from entry. Secondly, it is only the higher
consumer categories which provide the data source for the production
of advertising imagery which appears on the screens that dot the
consumption landscape. The excluded are unable to see their own
lifestyles in the consumer narratives and imagery which surround them
in their daily lives. They are thus excluded from both the material and
ideological infrastructure which shapes and maintains consumption.
It is clear from this survey that the surveillance potential of EFTS lies
not just in the extension of organisational control and interorganisational cooperation, as maintained by Kling.i95 Or, simply in the
extension of the frequency and quality of transactional contacts between
organisation and client, in a way similar to that in Wilson's example of
videotex. EFTS is deeply implicated in the emerging corporate structure
of consumption, and its permanent expansion and intensification, along
carefully constructed spatial and temporal patterns. Yet it is also more
than just a process of more efficiently illuminating consumption in
order to better manage it according to changing corporate needs. In
many ways the combination of EFTS and the other consumption
technologies such as videotex and direct marketing, and intensive
consumer profiling, are leading to a coordinated disciplinary apparatus
of consumption, which combines, in Foucault's terms, both totalising
and individualising moments. The anonymous consuming mass is
individualised - located, identified, targeted, profiled, seduced into
consuming certain products at certain locations, and finally, penaUsed
for underconsumption, overconsumption and transgressions of
prescribed rules. As Foucault would say, individuals are circulated,
distributed and classified - in a 'geometry of visible difference' according to 'precise networks of relations'. The totalising moment
consists of mobilising the differentiated and segmented mass back into a
combined force for consumption, increasing its mass and power by
l94For a run down of the 40 PRIZM categories see, H. Katzenstein and W.S. Sachs, Direct Marketing
(Charles E Merril, Columbus, Ohio, 1986), p. 147.
195r. Kling, 'Value Conflicts and Social Choice in Electronic Funds Transfer System Developments',
Communications of the ACM, Vol.21, No.8, August 1978, p.652

drawing in behaviours and practices thus far resistant to its pull. This
might mean the further colonisation of domestic life, and leisure and
sporting pursuits, or, for example, the further privatisation and
conmiodification of health and education. Yet it is clearly not the
discourses alone which are producing this outcome but explicit
combinations of corporate power via a massive, and not always
apparent, surveillance infrastructure.
What about the state?
Before concluding, it is important to anticipate the criticism of the
privacy theorists that the radical thesis of surveillance is too narrowly
concerned with the explosion of commercial surveillance, and that it
overlooks many aspects of state surveillance practices which are not
directly linked to capitalist discipline. This is partially true. There have
been no systematic studies of the ways in which the capitalist state stages
surveillance for its own disciplinary purposes. However, this does not
mean that the liberal privacy interpretation nor the pluralist
organisational approach are any better equipped to deal with this issue.
A consideration of state surveillance does not alter the problems and
deficiencies of the privacy analysis, and we have already noted how
organisational examples of surveillance are selected arbitrarily from
state and commercial sectors as though no real difference is expected
between the two. Furthermore, aspects of state surveillance addressed
by the privacy theorists are analysed in the formal framework of liberal
theory which prescribes a limited set of functions of the state in its
overall balance with private initiative.
In fact it can be argued that the state is deeply impHcated in the evolving
structure of capitalist discipline. Firstly, it is dependent on surplus
capital for its very existence and survival and is therefore under the
same constant pressure to expand and intensify accumulation. The state,
beside providing and maintaining much of the material infrastructure
which permits the efficient production and circulation of capital (eg.
transport and communications networks), is also primarily responsible
for the efficient reproduction of labour power. This involves providing
education, taxation, social welfare, law and order, industrial peace, and
managing political and social challenges to the existing socio-economic

In fact it can be argued that the state is deeply implicated in the evolving
structure of capitalist discipline. Firstly, it is dependent on surplus
capital for its very existence and survival and is therefore under the
same constant pressure to expand and intensify accumulation. The state,
beside providing and maintaining much of the material infrastructure
which permits the efficient production and circulation of capital (eg.
transport and communications networks), is also primarily responsible
for the efficient reproduction of labour power. This involves providing
education, taxation, social welfare, law and order, industrial peace, and
managing political and social challenges to the existing socio-economic
framework. Yet because the provision of these services for capital is
sourced by surplus capital there are permanent pressures to reduce
costs. Extensive surveillance is therefore necessary for the efficient
regulation of individual behaviour and many of the surveillance
techniques staged by capital are followed by the state. For example, state
departments and agencies have constructed extensive intra- and interorganisational data networks in order to provide a cross-system
enforcement of bureaucratic rules and regulations, the matching and
merging of taxation, welfare and criminal history data, and increasingly
instantaneous, automated auditing of individuals, based on data from a
number of departmental sources. In addition, as Wicklein and Bumham
have indicated, statistical profiling is becoming widespread as a
surveillance practice, reproducing the usual biases against certain social
groups. With the introduction of unique identity numbers, individual
transaction routes can be more easily tracked by state agencies, and data
gathered at various points can be more easily exchanged. All these
techniques help to enforce rules of individual performance, tying people
closely to bureaucratic rules and regulations. As in the sphere of
consumption, individuals can be penalised, punished, and excluded from
state services all the more effectively. Recent studies have also pointed
to the potential introduction of citizen 'smart cards' which will be able
to store health, welfare, tax and criminal history data under a single
personal identifier, allowing the updating of data at transactional
interfaces between individuals and state agencies, and increasingly
detailed audits of individual compHance to regulations.is^
196Reese op cit, p. 135

CONCLUSION
This study of the dominant theories of modem surveillance has aimed to
improve the social analysis of both the purpose of its operations and the
range of its effects. This has, firstly, meant tracing closely the social and
political assumptions which form the basis of the 'invasion of privacy'
interpretation. In the studies of the privacy theorists the very definition
of surveillance and the effect of its operations are determined by the
way in which privacy is constructed. Privacy, as a measure of
personally owned space, and the protective barrier behind which the
universal ideals of liberty and autonomy are sustained, lends itself
obviously to an interpretation of surveillance as invasion or intrusion
into that space, and equally obviously, to the distortion of these critical
human functions. This construct had two important effects. Privacy was
seen as a universal aspect of human existence, differing only in its scope
within various cultures. And the necessity of, and the right to, privacy,
across all cultures, gave it an abstract and formal quality, something
owned by individuals irrespective of their location in the structure of
social power.
Secondly, this formahsing of the individual as a bearer of privacy fitted
naturally with the formalised and abstract individualism which provides
the base of liberal social and political theory. In the architecture of
classical liberalism a series of balances operates in which the rights and
obligations of legal subjects are balanced with equally specific rights and
obligations of a public reahn charged with protecting, enhancing, and
occasionally limiting, the liberty of private cidzens. In such an
architecture, surveillance was considered crucial as a method of
securing individual compliance with the administration of social good
(centred on the protection of hberty and property). However, conditions
of rapid technological change, deepening social complexity, and an
increasingly mobile citizenry were leading to an expansion and
intensification of surveillance as part of a move toward the
bureaucratised administration of life in which unique individuals were
being submerged into a formless mass of social atoms. In these
circumstances excessive surveillance had to be carefully controlled if the
rights of the individual, including privacy as the core of these rights,
were to be salvaged. Yet in keeping with the tenets of liberal theory

already laid out for them. And like the earlier studies, little attempt has
been made to show just how computerised surveillance invades the
important inner zones of privacy or why surveillance is expanding and
intensifying. In addition, the continuing concentration on privacy
further obscured which social groups or social functions were being
targeted by new surveillance techniques, and for what purpose.
The work of James Rule and his colleagues has been interpreted here as
the beginnings of a radical critique of modem surveillance. One which
attempted to place the massive staging of surveillance as an integral
component of large scale social control. For Rule, bureaucratic
organisations constantly expand and improve surveillance in order to
better identify, locate, and control their interaction with clients for the
optimum enforcement of organisational rules and requirements. The
overall surveillance capacity of modem social systems depends on how
effectively the major organisations cooperate for the mutual
reinforcement of client control.
However, Rule's work is limited by its pluralist approach.
Organisations, like abstract individuals in the privacy interpretation, are
severed from the broader structure of modem capitalist society. No
distinction is made between private or public sector organisations, nor
their sectoral location, whether it be production, administration or
consumption.
The recent work of Gandy, Wilson, Webster and Robins, Poster, and
Davis is related more closely to Marxist social theory and seeks to
identify the ways in which new surveillance practices are embedded in
the maintenance of social exploitation and the evolving requirements of
capital accumulation. Gandy and Wilson move beyond organisational
pluralism and point to new combinations of corporate power utilising
new information and communication technologies - consumer profiling,
direct marketing, videotex - to mobiUse and direct individual behaviour
along lines beneficial to corporate needs. Their studies show how
surveillance operates to reinforce and extend the uneven distribution of
social power, further excluding the economically and politically
disenfranchised. Webster and Robins adapt Foucault's metaphor of the
panopticon to contemporary conditions of electronic panopticism in

new information and communication technologies - consumer profiling,
direct marketing, videotex - to mobilise and direct individual behaviour
along lines beneficial to corporate needs. Their studies show how
surveillance operates to reinforce and extend the uneven distribution of
social power, further excluding the economically and politically
disenfranchised. Webster and Robins adapt Foucault's metaphor of the
panopticon to contemporary conditions of electronic panopticism in
which corporately operated networks of data flow from centre to a
multitude of peripheral nodes located in homes, workplaces, shops, sites
of consumption in order to discipline individual performance around
shifting conmiercial requirements. Finally, in the brief study of EFTS
the technological and social threads of contemporary surveillance intensifying corporate combinations, instantaneous, automated tracking
of consumer movement, the disciplinary mobilisation of consumers
along specific corporate routes, and the classification of product-related
consumer identities - are brought together in the complex shaping of
individual behaviour which characterises the hidden processes behind
the information landscape of late capitalism.
Modem surveillance is much more than the simple invasion of privacy
or the unspecified application of social control. Its operations are
intimately linked to the growing integration of individuals into the
mechanisms of late capitalist social power. The recent ebbing of
organised resistance to this power will, in the immediate future at least,
ensure that new elaborations of technology, surveillance and discipline
are relatively free to tie everyday patterns of social life even more
closely to the expanding circuits of capital.

89
REFERENCES
Australian Science and Technology Council, Towards a Cashless Society,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987.
L.B. Becker, 'A Decade of Research on Interactive Cable', in W.H. Dutton,
J.G. Blumerand K.L. Kraemer, eds. Wired Cities, O.K. Hall and Co. Boston,
Mass. 1987.
C.J. Bennett, 'Computers, Personal Data, and Theories of Technology:
Comparative Approaches to Privacy Protection in the 1990's', Science,
Technology and Human Values, Vol.16, No.1, 1991.
N. Buck, M. Drennan and K. Newton, 'Dynamics of the Metropolitan
Economy', in S.S. Fainstein, I. Gordon and M. Harloe eds. Divided Cities,
Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1992.
D. Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State, Weidenfeld and Nicholson,
London, 1983
D. Campbell and S. O'Connor, On the Record: Surveillance, Computers and
Privacy - The Inside Story, M. Joseph, London, 1986.
J. Chesneaux, 'Information Society as Civic Mutation', Arena, 81, 1987.
R.T. Clark, 'Electronic Funds Transfer: The Creeping Revolution',
Telecommunications Policy, Vol.8, No.1, March 1984.
R.A. Clarke, 'Information Technology and Dataveillance', Communications of
the ACM, May 1988, Vol. 31, No.5.
Commission for the Future, Issues fora Cashless Society, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987.
David Shepard Associates Inc. The New Direct Marketing, Homewood,
Illinois, 1990.
K.M. Davidson, Megamergers, Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass. 1985.
A. Davies, 'Privacy and the Consumer', Australian Communications, March
1992.
M. Davis, City of Quartz, Verso, London, 1990.
•Developments in Credit Reporting', The Privacy Bulletin, Vol.7, No.1, April
1991.
E. Dunn, 'Distinguishing Statistical and Intelligence Systems' in A.F. Westin
(ed.), Information Technology in a Democracy Harvard University Press,
Cambridge Mass. 1971.
M. Foucault, The Order of Things, Tavistock Publications, London, 1986.

O.H. Gandy Jr. 'Information Privacy and the Crisis of Control', in M. Raboy
and P. A. Bruckeds. Communication For and Against Democracy, Black
Rose Books, Montreal, 1989.
P.N. Goldstene, The Collapse of the Liberal Empire, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1977.
S.H. Gray, 'Electronic Databases and Privacy: Policy for the 1990's',
Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol.14, No.3, Summer, 1989.
S Hall, 'Thatcherism - A New Stage?', Marxism Today, February, 1980.
K. Hayashi, 'Japan's Commitment to Strategic Telecom Use', Transnational
Data and Communications Report, July/August 1992.
H.E. Hudson, Communication Satellites: Their Development and Impact,
The Free Press, London, 1990.
H. Katzenstein and W.S. Sachs, Direct Marketing, Charies E. Merrill,
Columbus, Ohio, 1986.
R. Kling, 'Value Conflicts and Social Choice in Electronic Funds Transfer
System Developments', Communications of the ACM, Vol.21, No.8, August
1978.
R. Kling, 'The Struggles for Democracy in an Information Society', The
Information Society, Vol.4, No.1/2.
J Langdale, 'Electronic Funds Transfer and the Internationalisation of the
Banking and Finance Industry', Geoforum, Vol.16, No.1, 1985.
B. Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the Worid', in K. KnorrCetina and M. Mulkay, eds. Science Observed, Sage, London, 1983.
K.C. Laudon, 'Comment on "Preserving Individual Autonomy in an
Information-Oriented Society'", in LJ Hoffman (ed.). Computers and Privacy
in the Next Decade, Academic Press Inc. New York, 1980.
K.C. Laudon, The Dossier Society, Columbia University Press, New York,
1986.
K.C. Laudon, 'Comments on "Democracy in an information Society": The
Dossier Society', The Information Society Vol.4, No.1/2, 1986.
D.F. Linowes, Privacy in America, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1989.
T.V. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd. Edition, W.W. Norton and Co. New
York, 1979.
E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, NLB, London, 1976.

B. Martin, 'Computers on the Road: the Soda! Implications of Automatic
Vehicle Identification', Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol.67, No.5, October 1990.
J. Martin and A.R. Norman, The Computehsed Society, Prentice-Hall Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970.
G.T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1988.
G.T. Marx, 'Privacy and Technology', The World and I, September 1990.
G.T. Marx and S. Sherizen, 'Monitoring on the Job', in T. Forester, (ed.).
Computers in the Human Context, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.
A.R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy, University of Michigan Press, 1971.
V. Mosco, Pushbutton Fantasies, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey, 1982.
A. Mowshowitz, The Conquest of Will: Information, Processing in Human
Affairs, Reading, Mass. 1976.
A. Mowshowitz, 'Comment on "Preserving Individual Autonomy in an
Information-Oriented Society'", in L.J Hoffman (ed.). Computers and Privacy
in the Next Decade, Academic Press Inc. New York, 1980.
i
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Electronic Funds
Transfer: Plastic Cards and the Consumer, OECD, Paris, 1989.
M. Poster, The Mode of Information, Polity Press. Cambridge, 1990.
The Privacy Committee, Consumer Credit Reporting: An Overview,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1979.
J.A Reese, 'Smart Cards: Microchip Technology Revolutionises the
Development of Bank Cards', Telecommunications Journal, Vol.59, No.3,
1992.
P.M. Regan, 'Personal Information Policies in the United States and Britain:
The Dilemma of Implementation Considerations', Journal of Public Policy,
Vol.4, No.1, 1985.
K. Robins and F. Webster, 'Cybernetic Capitalism: Information, Technology,
Everyday Life', in V. Mosco and J. Wasko eds. The Political Economy of
Information, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988.
K. Robins and F.Webster, 'Athens Without Slaves...Or Slaves Without
Athens? The Neurosis of Technology', Science as Culture, No.3, 1988.
J.B. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance, Allen and Lane, London,
1973.

J.B. Rule, 'Data Wars: Privacy Protection in Federal Policy', in P.R. Newberg
ed. New Directions in Telecommunications Policy, Duke University Press,
London, 1989.
J.B. Rule, D. McAdam, L Stearns and D. Uglow, 'Preserving Individual
Autonomy in an Information-Oriented Society', in LJ. Hoffman, (ed.),
Computers and Privacy in the Next Decade, Academic Press Inc. New York,
1980.
J.B. Rule, D. McAdam, L. Stearns and D. Uglow, The Politics of Privacy,
Elsevier, New York, 1980.
J.B. Rule, D. McAdam, L. Stearns and D. Uglow, 'Documentary Identification
and Mass Surveillance in the United States', Social Problems, Vol.31, No.2,
December 1983.
S. Saxby, The Age of Information, New York University Press, N.Y. 1990.
P. Scott, 'Road Transport Informatics: Challenging the Freedom of the
Roads?', Prometheus, Vol.9, No.2, 1991.
S. Singh, 'Changing Relationships Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions', in New Directions in Consumer Financial Services, a National
Consumer Affairs Advisory Council Forum, Canberra, 1990.
T.D. Sterling, 'Democracy in an Information Society', The Information
Society, Vol.4, No. 1/2.
United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations, Transnational
Corporations in World Development, United Nations, New York, 1988.
'Voice Networks and Databases', The Privacy Bulletin, Vol.7, No.1, April
1991.
M. Warner and M. Stone, The Data Bank Society Allen and Unwin, 1970.
F. Webster and K. Robins, Information Technology: A Luddite Analysis,
Ablex, Norwood, NJ, 1986.
M.J. Weiss, The Clustering of America, Harper and Row, New York, 1988.
M.R. Wessel, Freedom's Edge, Addison-Wesley, 1975.
A.F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, Atheneum, New York,1967.
A.F. Westin, 'Civil Liberties Issues in Public Databanks', in Westin ed.
Information Technology in a Democracy, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass. 1971.
A.F. Westin, 'Managing Consumer Privacy Issues - a Checklist',
Transnational Data and Communications Report, July/August, 1991.

A.F. Westin and AF Baker, Data Banks in a Free Society: Computers,
Record-Keeping and Privacy, Quadrangle, New York, 1982.
J. Wicklein, The Electronic Nightmare, Beacon Press, Boston, 1981.
K.G. Wilson, Technologies of Control, University of Wisconsin Press,
Madison, 1988.

J.S.ÄITGHISOM

